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Editorial
We regret to announce that after 35 years this issue of the EJP will 
be the last issue published for the foreseeable future.
Due to a combination of factors, including a decline in submissions 
over the last couple of years (possibly related to the UK government's 
research evaluation framework which links university funding to the 
number  of  publications  in  larger,  more  mainstream  journals)  and 
unfavourable developments in the HE sector, we have decided that the 
journal will have to take a publication hiatus.
We plan to maintain the website (http://ejp.org.uk/) for as long as 
possible,  with  the  aim  of  making  back  issues  of  the  journal  freely 
available in PDF format,  and hope to re-launch the journal  in more 
favourable times.
This has been a very difficult decision for us and we have done our 
utmost to prevent this from happening, but as the only independent 
journal in the field we are left with little choice.
Thank  you  all  for  your  continued  support  over  the  years.
Ian Baker, Paul Staples, and Paul Stevens
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A Methodological Issue in the Study of Correlation 
between Psychophysiological Variables
Edwin C. May, S. James P. Spottiswoode & 
Laura V. Faith
Laboratories for Fundamental Research, California, U.S.A
Abstract
We used previously accumulated skin conductance (SC) and EEG  
data to examine the effects of their respective autocorrelations upon  
hypothesis testing. We found that SC data remain auto-correlated  
for many seconds,  and that EEG data remain auto-correlated for  
many fractions of a second depending upon filtering parameters.  
We show that the effect of these non-zero autocorrelations upon the  
interpretation of correlation coefficients using normal statistics can  
lead to substantially inflated significance levels.  We demonstrate  
that standard Monte Carlo techniques can provide valid estimates  
of  the  significance  levels.  We critically  review  a  paper  claiming  
significant correlation between the EEG’s of isolated participants  
Grinberg-Zylberbaum,  Delaflor,  Attie,  and  Goswami  (1994);  
however,  using uncorrelated EEG data from one of our previous  
studies  and  Monte  Carlo  methods  to  model  the  true  null  
hypothesis,  we  compute  a  non-significant  difference  (Z  =  1.22)  
between their non-“correlated” participants and their “correlated”  
ones in contrast with their claims of significance.
Correspondence details: Dr. Edwin May, Laboratories for Fundamental Research, 330 Cowper Street, 
Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA. Email: may@lfr.org.
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Introduction
The field of research parapsychology has evolved to the point that 
there  is  now  incontrovertible  evidence  of  a  statistical  information 
transfer anomaly. In other words, we must reject the null hypothesis. 
Some of the recent meta-analyses that address issues of methodology, 
replication, and summary statistics can be found in Utts (1991; 1996), 
Bem and Honorton (1994), and Radin (1997). Note that we have been 
careful not to claim that the existence for ESP has been proved. Rather, 
given that ESP has a negative definition — it is what happens when 
nothing else should — the declaration of an anomaly is the only valid 
statement that can be made.
One of many possible avenues toward trying to understand the 
underlying mechanisms of this anomaly (hence forth called ESP) is to 
search  for  psychophysiological  correlates.  There  is  a  substantial 
literature describing many different approaches, but it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to delve into an analysis of this work. Instead, we 
will focus on one technical aspect.
With  the  decrease  of  cost  and  increased  capability  of 
psychophysiological and computer hardware and software it becomes 
increasingly  attractive  and  feasible  to  monitor  psychophysiology  of 
isolated participants in a variety of circumstances in ESP experiments. 
One method, for example, would be to search for correlations between 
data epochs of isolated pairs of participants.
Our  paper  reviews  the  well-known underlying  assumptions  on 
correlation statistics, shows examples from skin conductance and EEG 
data of  what happens if  the assumptions are violated, and suggests 
ways to use  Monte Carlo techniques  to obtain  valid statistics  when 
these  assumptions  are  violated.  In  addition,  we  provide  a  critical 
analysis  of  one  set  of  published  experiments  claiming  an  ESP-
transferred  event-related  potential  from  one  isolated  participant  to 




It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  provide  an  exhaustive 
methodological critique of previous studies nor do we wish to provide 
a complete view into the complex methodologies associated with the 
measurement of psychophysiological variables. Rather, we will focus 
on a single issue: what is the correct approach to measure a correlation 
between psychophysiological variables?
We  have  all  been  taught  that  a  clear  understanding  of  all  the 
explicit  and  implicit  assumptions  is  absolutely  necessary  before 
applying statistical  formulae to a problem. However,  while we may 
believe this to be important, it is often overlooked when it comes time 
to  actually  analyze  data.  It  is  tempting  to  take  advantage  of  the 
sophisticated statistical software that is available that makes complex 
analyses  a  simple  task  of  pressing  a  button.  But,  of  course,  this 
convenience has a negative side, also.
Let us review the familiar Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r:
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where n is the number of pairs of data points and X and Y are vectors 
containing the data. As we recall, the assumption is that both X and Y 
are each distributed normally and are  random variables (i.e., the data 
points in X are independent of each other and the data points in Y are 
independent  of  each  other).1 x   and y  are  means  of  X and  Y, 
respectively.  If  these  assumptions  are  met,  there  are  a  number  of 
methods to assess the significance level of a given r for n-2 degrees of 
freedom. For example, we can use a Fischer’s Z transform to arrive at a 
Z-Score that is distributed, under the null hypothesis as N(0,1):
1 We  can  relax  the  normality  requirement  by  using  a  non-parametric  correlation  such  as  Spearman’s  ρ, 
however the random variable assumption remains.
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We will only examine the degree to which the Z-score formalism 
holds  for  actual  psychophysiological  data,  because  the  underlying 
assumptions for the T-score formalism are similar.2
To see the effects of the violation of the independence assumption, 
we used skin conductance and EEG data from separate experiments as 
a test bed.
Test Data Sets
To represent  the central  nervous  system,  we used 5-minutes  of 
occipital (O1) EEG data that we collected from two different people on 
two different  days.  To represent  the  autonomic  nervous  system we 
used  skin  conductance  DMILS  data  from  a  study  at  Edinburgh 
University.3 We randomly selected five minutes of data each from two 
different participants who’s sessions were on different days. Thus with 
both data sets we assume that the expected correlation is zero.
Analysis: Autonomic nervous system variables
As an example of an autonomic nervous system variable, we begin 
with the skin conductance (SC) data. It is well known that SC varies 
slowly and is  not  random (Levenson & Ruef,  1992;  Gottman,  1981). 
That is, each new data point contains a “memory” of the previous data 
2 Often in EEG research, coherence is used rather than a correlation measure. Coherence measures usually  
involve FFT’s which are linear transforms of the data. Such a transform will not remove the autocorrelation so  
the interpretation problems will remain. We will not, therefore, include a coherence analysis in this paper.
3 We thank Professor Deborah Delanoy for  granting us access to her  data from an as of yet unpublished  
sender/no sender DMILS study (Delanoy, Row, & Brady, 2001).
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points. Figure 1 shows the autocorrelation function for one of the SC 
data sets.
Figure 1. Autocorrelation: Skin conductance and random data
We computed the autocorrelation for lags from -30 to +30 seconds. 
The noisy curve with a “spike” at zero lag is the autocorrelation of 
normally distributed random data. That is, each successive sample of 
the  random data has  no “memory” as  to  the value  of  the previous 
sample. The skin conductance data are different. We notice that there is 
a correlation of about 0.5 for lags as long as about eight seconds. That 
means  that  the  SC  data  point  being  measured  now  contains 
information about the SC data eight seconds previously.
Clearly  this  is  a  strong  violation  of  the  random-variable 
assumption  built  into  both  the  Pearson’s  r and  Spearman’s  ρ 
correlation functions which require  an autocorrelation similar to the 
random one shown in Figure 1. The critical question is to what degree 
does  a  strong  skin  conductance  autocorrelation  affect  a  statistical 
evaluation?
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To address this question, we used a Monte Carlo technique. For 
each of 1,000 passes, we randomly selected 10-second intervals (i.e., 160 
points),  one  each  from  the  two  independent  SC  data  records.  In 
addition, for each pass, we computed two separate random vectors of 
the  same length as  the  SC data,  each of  which were  distributed as 
N(0,1). We computed a Pearson’s r and a Spearman’s ρ for the pair of 
SC  data  and  for  the  random  data.  The  distributions  are  shown  in 
Figure 2.
The effect of having such a strong autocorrelation is immediately 
obvious in Figure 2a. The correlation of random data, which is shown 
as the dark Gaussian-shaped histogram centered on zero, ranges from 
about  –.25  to  +.25  as  expected  for  correlation  coefficients  with  158 
degrees of freedom. The surprise is the nearly uniform distribution of 
correlation coefficients for both Pearson’s r (lightest) and Spearman’s ρ, 
which is shown as the more uniform darker distribution. The peaks of 
the distributions near unity correlation is expected for non-specific skin 
conductance in that the two participants were essentially relaxing in 
the absence of overt  stimuli.  So both SC records tended to decrease 
throughout the 10-second epoch leading to an excess of large positive 
correlation values.
Figure 2. Skin conductance and random data
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Figure 2b shows the distribution of Z-scores computed from the 
Fischer’s  Z as shown above. The darker histogram centered on zero 
shows the expected range of Z-scores  for uncorrelated random data 
that meet all the criteria for the proper interpretation of Pearson’s  r. 
The highly auto-correlated SC data on the other hand, which fails the 
random-variable  criterion,  and is  shown as  the lighter  histogram in 
Figure 2a shows Z-scores (Figure 2b) that range from misleading -20 to 
+20 even for totally uncorrelated data!
The proper way to asses a probability of an observed correlation 
between epochs which are themselves highly auto-correlated is to use a 
Monte Carlo technique.4
To demonstrate how this works,  consider the lightest histogram 
shown  in  Figure  2a  above.  We  generated  that  histogram  from  the 
correlation of 1,000 pairs of 10-second SC epochs. Suppose we wish to 
compute a Z-score for an observed correlation, ro. The following are the 
steps to compute a valid one-tailed Z-score:
1. Order  the  1,000  element  correlation  vector  from  smallest  to  
largest.
2. Compute how many correlation values are greater than or equal 
to ro.
3. Break ties by computing the centre position among the ties.
The p-value is computed as:
' ,onumber of r s rp
total number of correlations
≥
=
and can be converted into a Z-score by the usual  method.  Figure 3 
shows the distribution of 10,000 Z-scores with SC data resulting from 
the Monte Carlo calculation described above.
4 We do not claim to be the first  to come up with the idea of applying Monte Carlo techniques  to assess  
probability. This technique can be found in the literature under such names including permutation technique 
— partial or complete and bootstrap methods.
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Figure 3. Monte Carlo derived Z-score distribution
This is a well-behaved  N(0,1) distribution that is expected under 
the null hypothesis of no correlation even in the case of highly auto-
correlated data. Although the standard formalism to compute Z-scores 
from correlations  must  be  rejected  in auto-correlated  data,  a  Monte 
Carlo  calculation  can  give  reasonable  non-assumptive  and  non-
parametric estimates of the likelihood of such correlations given the 
data sets at hand.
We  have  used  skin  conductance  to  illustrate  the  problems 
associated with a slowly varying autonomic nervous system variable; 
however, the same problems will exist with other such variables that 
include heart rate, respiration rate, and blood volume. We recommend 
the use of Monte Carlo methods to make statistical assessments for all 
correlations among these types of variables.
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Analysis: Central nervous system variables
The problem of correctly assessing correlations also exists with the 
central  nervous  system  data,  though  less  severely.  We  filtered  five 
minutes of occipital (O1) EEG data from 8 to 10 Hz and computed the 
auto correlation for lags between -1 and +1 second. For comparison, we 
generated the equivalent length of random data which was distributed 
as N(0,1).5 Both autocorrelation functions are shown in Figure 4. The 
“spike” at zero lag is for the random data as expected. In the alpha 
EEG case, the autocorrelation function, while significantly shorter than 
for skin conductance data, nonetheless is significantly longer than for 
random data. In Figure 4, we have shown both plus and minus lags to 
be complete; however, only the negative lags have meaning. That is, 
EEG alpha “memory” lasts for approximately one half second, or the 
EEG alpha value being measure “now” contains information about the 
EEG alpha value as much as 0.5 seconds earlier.
Figure 4. Autocorrelation of EEG alpha and random data
5 For  psychophysiological  data,  there  are  potentially  two  sources  that  contribute  to  the  autocorrelation 
function. The first is inherent in the system, and the second results from applying filters to the data. In this  
paper,  we  show  random  data  which  is  distributed  as  N(0,1) to  illustrate  the  effects  of  non-zero 
autocorrelations.
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The question is to what degree does this shorter autocorrelation 
influence the statistical  assessment of correlations between two such 
sets of data? We randomly selected 1,000 10-second epochs from each 
of the two EEG records and computed correlations (i.e., Pearson’s r) for 
each epoch pair. Figure 5a shows the distributions of these correlations.
Figure 5. Correlation distributions of EEG alpha and random data
The wide, lighter, nearly Gaussian shape is the distribution for the 
alpha, whereas the narrow, darker distribution is for random data. So 
even with a sharply reduced autocorrelation function compared to skin 
conductance,  nonetheless,  EEG-α  correlations  can  be  seriously 
misleading. Figure 5b shows the equivalent Z-score distributions. We 
notice that the Z-score distribution for the random data is as expected; 
however, as in the skin conductance case, the Z-score distribution for 
the EEG data can lead to wildly incorrect answers. 
As in the case of skin conductance data (Figure 3), a Monte Carlo 
approach gives a N(0,1) distribution and allows for a valid assessment 
for correlation between separate central nervous system alpha epochs.
Analysis summary
We have shown that the underlying assumptions that would allow 
the use of a Fischer’s Z transform to compute the significance levels of 
a Pearson’s r correlation are substantially violated with autonomic and 
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central  nervous  system data.  Of course  this  is  a  well  known result; 
however, in the next section we will show an example of a “land mark” 
paper that ignored these difficulties.
Discussion
Grinberg-Zylberbaum (1982) became interested in studying EEG 
correlation  between  communicating  individuals,  and  he  and  his 
colleagues published similar studies for over a decade.6 
The basic idea behind this research was to examine correlations 
between individuals at various stages of communication. For example, 
participants were sequestered together in the same room (Grinberg-
Zylberbaum & Ramos, 1987) and broad-band (i.e., 3 – 45 Hz) EEG was 
measured simultaneously, or in isolated chambers using a “telepathic” 
paradigm  (Grinberg-Zylberbaum,  Delaflor,  Arellano,  Guevara,  & 
Perez, 1992). Pearson’s  r’s were computed and displayed graphically 
for visual inspection and quantitative analyses. Grinberg-Zylberbaum 
and Ramos (1987) observed what they described as strong coherence 
between these sets of EEG records and presented means and standard 
errors for the correlations under various conditions. Since they do not 
mention  any  Monte  Carlo  methods,  we  assume  they  used  normal 
statistics.
For the remainder of this discussion, we will focus upon a paper 
by Grinberg-Zylberbaum, Delaflor, Attie, and Goswami (1994) because 
it is the most detailed with regard to methodological issues and is often 
referenced  as  the  quintessential  example  of  quantum  coherence 
between isolated brains.7 Hence forth we will  refer  to this paper as 
ZDAG.
6 It is not our purpose to single out this group for our critical remarks; however, their pioneering research has 
invoked substantial experimental, theoretical, and philosophical interest.
7 We will only focus upon the methodologies associated with the correlation calculations and the resulting 
conclusions rather than providing a complete critique of the whole paper.
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ZDAG overview
The  basic  idea  behind  this  paper  was  to  observe  event  related 
potentials (ERP) in the EEG record of an isolated individual while a 
second isolated individual was being stimulated with 100 random light 
flashes — the details of which were not described in the paper. EEG 
was also monitored from the participant who was directly stimulated. 
There were two conditions of interest:
Before interaction: In this condition called Condition 1 in the paper, 
the above measurements were made between individuals who had not 
met or interacted in any way.
After interaction: In this condition called Condition 2 in the paper, the 
individuals  were  introduced  to  each  other  inside  the  stimulation 
chamber and instructed to “get to know” each other and then to “feel 
one another in meditative silence” for 20 minutes before the above EEG 
measures were obtained.
Standard ensemble averaging was performed over the 100 stimuli 
for the “sender” from zero to about 0.5 seconds relative to the stimulus, 
and using the same stimuli markers, a similar ensemble average was 
carried out in the “receiver’s” EEG record.
All EEG records were filtered between 12.7 and 35 Hz prior to the 
ensemble averaging. The goal was to observe an ERP in the sender and 
see a correlated ERP in the receiver. For 48 steps of 16 samples each, a 
Pearson’s  r was computed. Thus, a temporal record of the correlation 
could be observed for about 0.5 seconds relative to the stimulus. The 
authors  do  not  indicate  how  significance  levels  were  computed,  a 
quantitative statistical  measure between Conditions 1 and 2,  nor do 
they mention whether any Monte Carlo methods were used; thus we 
presume they used a “standard” Z or T method.
16
Correlating Psychophysiological Variables
Within the first 132 ms, they report correlation levels ranging from 
.700 to .929 corresponding to p < .009.8
Independent evaluation of mean chance expectation
For our evaluation, we used two 5-minute EEG records far from 
any  putative  stimuli  from  different  days  and  different  participants 
from our 1994 ERD study. The null hypothesis was that no significant 
correlation between these isolated records would be found. 
Following the procedure described in ZDAG, we filtered both EEG 
records  from 12.7  to  35  Hz  and  arbitrarily  labeled  one  of  the  EEG 
records as  the “sender” (i.e.,  the participant  who experienced direct 
stimulation) and the second as the “receiver.” For each of a 2,500 pass 
simulation, we:
• Randomly selected 100 entry points into the sender’s record to 
simulate 100 stimuli.
• Identified the same entry points into the receiver’s record.
• Ensemble averaged 64 data points (0.5 seconds)  starting at  
each of all 100 stimuli separately for the sender and receiver 
EEG records.
• Followed ZDAG’s computation and computed four 16-point  
Pearson’s  r correlation coefficients between the sender and  
receiver ensemble averaged data in each 64-point epoch.
Thus  we  computed  a  total  of  10,000  values  for  the  correlation 
coefficient.  At  the  same  time  we  computed  10,000  correlation 
coefficients  for  random variables,  which were  distributed  as  N(0,1). 
Figures  6a  and 6b show these  distributions  and their  equivalent  Z-
score  distributions  under  the  assumption  of  normal  statistics, 
respectively.
The darker distributions are associated with the random data and, 
and the wider lighter distributions are associated with the correlations 
8 It is not clear how this value was computed since it does not correspond to any correlation in the range  
quoted in the paper.
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as  described  above.  As  we  can  see,  even  for  this  relatively  high 
frequency EEG data (i.e.,  12.7  to 35 Hz),  their  remains considerable 
difference between truly random data and uncorrelated EEG.9
Figure 6. Pearson’s r for ERP simulation and random data
We computed a Z-score distribution resulting from a Monte Carlo 
calculation, similar to that described above so that we could compute a 
valid Z-score for a given observed Pearson’s r.
The consequences for the differences between the EEG correlation 
and that for random data can be seen in Figure 7.  Note that the p-
values  are  1-tailed  and  are  shown on a  log  scale.  The  lower  curve 
represent the p-values associated with a given r under the assumption 
of  random  variables  that  are  not  auto-correlated.  The  upper  curve 
represents a more valid assessment of the  p-value from Monte Carlo 
analysis that does not require this assumption.
We have chosen to illustrate an enhancement of the p-value for a 
correlation value of 0.7 because that was the minimum value quoted in 
ZDAG. At larger values of the correlation the artifact becomes even 
larger. As Figure 7 shows, a p-value of .0009 (the lower horizontal line) 
9 The effects of frequency can be seen by comparing Figures 5b and 6b. The lower frequency gives a much 
broader Z-score distribution for mean chance expectation than does the higher frequency EEG.
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will  be  found  using  normal  statistics;  whereas  the  correct  value  is 
0.0418 (the upper horizontal line).
Figure 7. Values under a normal and Monte Carlo assumption
Unfortunately no correlation values were given for  Condition 1 
(i.e., before the sender and receiver met); however, selected graphical 
representations in ZDAG for the correlations are shown for Condition 
1. ZDAG did not compute any quantitative difference between their 
conditions. If we assume, however, as ZDAG implies that Condition 1 
yields  no  correlation  (i.e.,  Z-score  =  0)  then  there  is  no  significant 
difference between the conditions for an observed correlation of .7:





where  the  value  1.73  is  the  Z-score  equivalent  of  the  one-tailed  
p-value = .0418 shown in Figure 7.
The selected graphical representations for Condition 2 in ZDAG 
appear quite impressive until  one realizes from Figure 7 above that 
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there is a sizeable likelihood of large correlation value even under the 
null  hypothesis.  So  with  selected  epochs  it  is  not  surprising  to  see 
rather impressive overlaps between the sender and receiver ensemble 
averaged data.
We computed the autocorrelation function for this set of EEG data 
in  the  higher  frequency  bands  and  found  that  as  expected  it  was 
narrower than it was for alpha, nonetheless,  it  is responsible for the 
breaking of the underlying assumption for the use of normal statistic 
and the resulting invalid p-values.10
Unfortunately,  there  is  insufficient  reporting  in  ZDAG  to 
determine  without  question  whether  their  claim  of  isolated  EEG 
evoked responses  are  correlated is  correct;  however,  in light  of  our 
results we urge caution in interpreting this and similar papers.11
Commentary
As  we  have  indicated  above,  there  have  been  a  number  of 
references to Grinberg-Zylberbaum and his colleagues’ work. In this 
section we provide quotes from three of these articles selected from 
some  of  the  papers  shown  in  the  References  Section  below.  The 
purpose of this section is to demonstrate how a concept can become 
embedded into the research community even though it may be in error 
in the first place. For example:
Dossey  (1997): “Grinberg-Zylberbaum's  team,  along  with  physicist 
Amit  Goswami,  propose  that  these  ‘transferred  potentials’  between 
brains  demonstrate  ‘brain-to-brain  nonlocal  EEG  correlations.’ 
Nonlocal correlations have been a concern of physicists since they were 
proposed by Einstein, Rosen, and Podolsky in 1935. From the moment 
they  were  hypothesized,  nonlocal  effects  have  stretched  the 
imagination  of  physicists  to  the  limits.  The  fact  that  they  occur 
10 We emphasize again that even higher frequency EEG data also fail the requirement for correlations that the  
data  be  random.  That  is,  each data  point  must  not  depend upon early values  of  the  data.  This  becomes  
increasingly less a problem the higher the frequency of the EEG data.
11 In ZDAG, the authors claim an EPR-type correlation, yet do not address such critical issues of the quantum 
correlation that is  required (i.e.,  their  Condition 2)  in  the light  of  substantial  evidence that environmental 
decoherence sets in at nano-degrees Kelvin; whereas the brain is at 3000 Kelvin.
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simultaneously between distant subatomic particles means that there is 
no “travel time” for any known form of energy to flow between them. 
But if there is no signal from one particle to the other, how could their 
behavior be correlated? How could one particle know what the other is 
up  to?  For  almost  half  a  century,  nonlocal  events  remained 
hypothetical  –  until  they  were  demonstrated  experimentally,  most 
notably in a celebrated study in 1982 by physicist  Alain Aspect and 
colleagues.12
Physicists  have  assumed  that  nonlocal  connections  exist  only 
between subatomic particles  such as  electrons  and photons.  But  the 
pioneering work of  Grinberg-Zylberbaum, Goswami,  and colleagues 
strongly suggests that these events occur also between human beings.”
Andrews  (1996): “In  fact,  several  generations  of  scientists  have 
amassed  evidence  in  support  of  remote  communication  anomalies. 
Numerous  studies  have  provided  evidence  that  identifiable  and 
consistent electrical brain signals (as distinguished from electrical brain 
signals occurring during control periods) occurred in one person when 
a  distant  second  person  was  either  meditating  or  provided  with 
sensory  stimulation,  or  when  a  distant  person  attempted  to 
communicate with the subject being monitored.”
Goswami (1999): “The striking similarity between the correlated brains 
of this experiment and the correlated photons of Aspect's should be 
clear,  but there is also a striking difference.  The similarity is that in 
both cases the initial correlation is produced by some ‘interaction.’ In 
the case of the photons, the interaction is purely physical. But in the 
case of the correlated brains, consciousness is involved. For correlated 
photons,  as  soon  as  the  possibility  wave  of  one  is  collapsed  by 
measurement, the objects become uncorrelated. But in the case of the 
12 Aside from ascribing special status to a flawed study, there is a huge error in Dossey’s reasoning. It  is  
understandable that classical thinking and gut level responses mislead with regard to quantum mechanics. 
Dossey is concerned with “…how could their  behavior  be correlated? This,  of  course makes the  incorrect 
assumption that these outgoing particles in an EPR setup possess properties such as polarization or spin in the 
absence  of  measurement  –  a  classical  idea,  only.  This  is  not  the  case  theoretically  and  experimentally  in 
quantum systems. Given this fact and the notion that systems that are once correlated and remain undisturbed 
stay correlated, – even for quantum systems – regardless. Thus there is no mystery with the results of EPR  
experiments.
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correlated  brains,  consciousness  not  only  establishes  correlation 
initially  but  also  maintains  the  correlation  over  the  duration  of  the 
experiment.  To get a clear evoked potential,  experimenters  typically 
use an averaging procedure over one-hundred or so light flashes in 
order  to  eliminate  the  ‘noise.’  But  the  brains  do  not  become 
uncorrelated  as  soon  as  one  observer  sees  a  light  flash.  The  only 
conclusion  is  that  consciousness  re-establishes  the  correlation  every 
time it is broken.
This  difference  between  correlated  photons  (as  in  Aspect's 
experiment)  and  correlated  brains  (as  in  Grinberg-Zylberbaum's 
experiment)  is  highly  significant.  The  nonlocality  of  correlated 
photons, although striking in terms of demonstrating the radicalness 
(sic)  of  quantum  physics,  cannot  be  used  to  transfer  information, 
according Eberhard's theorem. Each photon that one experimenter sees 
in a stream of photons is correlated with its partner that is observed by 
another experimenter. But there is no correlation between the states of 
the photons within the stream observed by one experimenter.  These 
states thus are randomly distributed, hence they can carry no message. 
But in the case of the correlated brains, since consciousness is involved 
in establishing and maintaining the correlation over the period of the 
entire experiment,  Eberhard's  theorem does not  apply, and message 
transfer is not forbidden.”
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that substantial errors can be made if the 
underlying  assumptions  concerning  hypothesis  testing  with 
correlations  are  violated,  and these errors  can propagate  within the 
research community. We used skin conductance and EEG data from 
previous  experiments  to  show  that  even  small  autocorrelations  can 
affect the resulting p-values by up to many orders of magnitude.
Fortunately,  we  were  also  able  to  demonstrate  that  by  using 
standard Monte Carlo techniques, it is possible to extract meaningful 
hypotheses testing test statistics.
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Given  the  simplicity  of  encoding  Monte  Carlo  analyses  into 
Microsoft’s Excel spread sheets and other programming languages, we 
urge  our  colleagues  to  adopt  this  method  in  all  further 
psychophysiological correlation studies and to resist the temptation to 
allow  the  elegant  and  sophisticated  software  packages  to  make 
decisions for us.
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Abstract
This  study investigated  the  role  of  reality  testing deficits  in the  
formation of paranormal beliefs and endorsement of urban legends.  
One  hundred  and  fifty-five  respondents  completed  an  online  
questionnaire booklet comprised of seven urban legends (or myths),  
the  Revised  Paranormal  Belief  Scale  (R-PBS),  and  the  Reality  
Testing  subscale  of  the  Inventory  of  Personality  Organization  
(IPO-RT).  As  predicted  all  urban  legend  attributes  (retelling,  
likelihood, importance, scariness, strangeness and heard by others), 
with  the  exception  of  unusualness,  were  found  to  be  positively  
correlated with reality testing scores and belief in the paranormal.  
Path  analysis  was  conducted  with  paranormal  belief  and reality  
testing as the independent variables, and urban legend truthfulness  
ratings as the dependent variable.  Controlling for  reality testing  
reduced the size of the relationship between paranormal belief and  
truthfulness ratings. Results of the current study concurred with  
those of Irwin (2003a,  2004), who concluded that reality testing  
deficits  were  fundamentally  involved  in  the  formation  and  
maintenance  of  some  paranormal  beliefs.  The  present  study  
suggests  that  reality testing deficits may also play an important  
role with regards to the adoption and endorsement of other related  
beliefs, such as urban legends. 
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Introduction
Urban legends are defined as enduring, apocryphal folk narratives 
that have reached a wide audience, usually by word of mouth or via 
email (Fox Tree & Weldon, 2007). Notable examples being: ‘The killer 
in  the  back  seat1’  and  ‘gang  initiation2’.  The  term  urban  legend  is 
synonymous  with other  less  frequently  used idioms,  such  as  urban 
myth, urban belief tale and contemporary legend. Urban legends also 
share common features with migratory legends.  These are recurring 
tales, which are tailored to fit individual sites (e.g., place names and/or 
topographical  details  are  adapted  to  particular  locations).  A related 
modern phenomenon is campus legends. These are stories, which are 
changed to accommodate people, events, or places on the campus of an 
educational institution.
Myriad urban legends, covering a range of issues and topics exist, 
and  for  each  legend  there  are  often  several  variants  (see 
http://snopes.com for a comprehensive range of examples). Whilst the 
provenance  of  urban  legends  often  remains  unattested,  and  their 
veracity is questionable, story authenticity is frequently implied by the 
teller’s assertion that the events happened to a ‘friend of a friend’. Even 
when tales have some basis in truth, facts may be distorted by repeated 
retelling (Barlett, 1932; Fox Tree & Weldon, 2007). 
Analysis of the content of urban legends has revealed a number of 
common features. The narrative contains surprising information, tales 
are  designed to make an emotional  impact,  and story features  may 
change with the passage of time (e.g., tales of heavenly intervention on 
the battlefield are updated to match a current conflict). Alternatively, 
new  urban  legends  arise,  which  reflect  modern  developments  and 
advancements (e.g.,  computer viruses).  In an attempt to differentiate 
urban legends from rumours, Guerin and Miyazaki (2006) delineated 
the conversational  properties of  urban legends.  They suggested that 
1 A good Samaritan warns a female driver about a dangerous man hiding in the back seat of her car.
2 Gang members  are  initiated  by  driving  without  headlights.  When  another  driver  notices  and  flashes  a 
warning they are required to pursue and kill the driver.
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urban legends can be characterised in the following way: the narrative 
is of general interest to most listeners; the truth of the tale is difficult to 
verify; the account may be ambiguous; the story is typically long; the 
legend contains a story plot; attention is gained with horror (shock) or 
scandal; new or novel content is evident; the story may be humorous; 
and the tale is unusual or unexpected (Guerin, 2003, 2004).  
Whilst  useful,  these  categorizations  were  not  intended  to  be 
definitive and are open to expansion.  For instance,  Brunvand (1981) 
observes that urban legends contain a symbolic message via an ironic 
twist (Robertson, 1987), which either warns of danger (e.g., computer 
viruses,  health  risks,  etc.),  or  contains  a  consequence  for  the  chief 
protagonist  (e.g.,  person stealing a parking space suffers damage to 
their  vehicle,  exam  cheat  is  detected  and  consequently  failed,  etc.) 
(Donavan, Mowen, & Chakraborty, 2001). The fact that urban legends 
purport  to  contain  important  helpful/advisory  information  may 
explain why they persist  despite the passage of time. The pervasive 
nature  of  urban  legends  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  they 
periodically resurface within the media (e.g., U.S. deports Israelis amid 
warnings of espionage activities). 
Historically, literature on urban legends has been closely linked to 
work  on  rumours  (Guerin  & Miyazaki,  2006).  The  major  difference 
between  urban  legends  and  rumours  is  that  rumours  are  always 
speculative, whilst legends are generally presented as facts (Rosnow, 
2001). Indeed, as Fox Tree & Weldon, (2007) point out, an important 
feature of urban legends is that they are told as true (Heath, Bell & 
Sternberg, 2001), or their truthfulness is the subject of discussion (Dégh 
& Vázsonyi, 1976). Coupled to this is the frequent disclaimer that the 
story may be untrue but there is a risk attached with not passing it on. 
The fact that implied truthfulness is a key component of many urban 
legends  made  them  an  attractive  stimulus  material  in  the  current 
study. Particularly, we sought to determine whether endorsement of 
urban  legends  was  related  to  belief  in  the  paranormal  and  reality 
testing deficits. Previous work in the area of belief in the paranormal 
and reality testing deficits has been undertaken by Irwin (2003a, 2004, 
2009).
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Irwin (2004) argues that whilst the functions of paranormal belief 
have  been  extensively  researched,  the  cognitive  or  information 
processing correlates of paranormal belief have been largely neglected. 
With this gap in mind Irwin (2003a, 2004) examined the formation of 
paranormal  beliefs  in  relation  to  reality  testing.  Irwin  (2003a,  2004, 
2009)  defines  reality  testing  as  the  inclination  to  test  critically  the 
logical plausibility of beliefs. These studies were grounded in the work 
of Langdon and Coltheart (2000), who posited that pathological beliefs 
or  delusions  arise  in  part  from  a  failure  to  subject  hypothetical 
explanations of sensory experience to critical testing (Irwin, 2004). 
Sensory experiences provide information about the environment 
and self,  which frequently require  explanations (casual  attributions), 
and thus are subject to bias (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Weiner, 1986). 
Normal, non-pathological belief generation is characterised by critical 
evaluation of explanations, where each hypothesis is considered and 
its plausibility assessed. This approach has been extended to explain 
the development and maintenance of paranormal beliefs (Goode, 2000; 
Irwin, 2004, 2003a; Zusne & Jones, 1982). In this context,  paranormal 
beliefs  arise  from intuitive-experiential  interpretations  of  anomalous 
events, which have not been subjected to analytical-rational processing 
(reality  testing)  (Irwin,  2009).  Paranormal  interpretations  are  then 
maintained  because  individuals  fail  to  rigorously  test  their  self-
generated explanations of the world (Irwin, 2004).
Irwin (2003a, 2004) investigated the role of reality testing deficits in 
the formation of belief in the paranormal.  Irwin (2003a) used the Bell 
Objects Relations and Reality Testing Inventory (BORRTI) (Bell, 1995) 
and found that scores on two fundamental factors of paranormal belief 
(New Age Philosophy, NAP; and Traditional Paranormal Belief, TPB) 
predicted reality testing deficits. This was particularly true of factors 
measuring Hallucinations and Delusions and Reality Distortion. Irwin 
(2004) expressed caution with regards to the latter finding because the 
reality testing measure (BORRTI) contained items tapping into belief in 
the  paranormal;  possession,  mystical  powers,  and  mind  reading. 
Whilst,  these  items  did  not  impact  upon  the  Hallucinations  and 
Delusions  dimension,  Irwin  (2003a)  acknowledged  that  the  results 
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should be replicated with a reality testing measure not contaminated 
by items related to paranormal belief (Irwin, 2004). Hence, in his follow 
up study, Irwin (2004) used an alternative measure of reality testing, 
the  Reality  Testing  subscale  of  the  Inventory  of  Personality 
Organization (IPO-RT — Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Kernberg & Foelsch, 
2001). The IPO-RT was selected because it makes no reference to belief 
in  the  paranormal,  and  it  canvasses  a  variety  of  aspects  of  reality 
testing. In addition to this the IPO-RT focuses on reality testing in the 
context  of  information  processing  style  rather  than  defining  it  as  a 
psychotic  phenomena.  Irwin  (2004)  argued  that  this  approach  was 
consistent with the evaluative processes account advanced by Langdon 
and Coltheart (2000): the IPO-RT was designed to assess “the capacity 
to differentiate self from non-self, intra psychic from external stimuli, 
and  to  maintain  empathy  with  ordinary  social  criteria  of  reality” 
(Kernberg, 1996, p. 120).
Irwin  (2004)  asked  participants  to  complete  the  Revised 
Paranormal  Belief  Scale  (R-PBS)  (Lange,  Irwin,  &  Houran,  2000; 
Tobacyk, 1988, 2004) alongside,  the IPO-RT. In total scores from 161 
participants  were  included  in  the  study.  The  sample  was  recruited 
through  friendship  networks  within  the  general  community  of 
Australian adults and was  heterogeneous in nature. As predicted by 
the results of  his  2003a study Irwin (2004) found that reality testing 
deficits  were  predicted  by NAP and TPB (Lange,  Irwin  & Houran, 
2000). On the basis of this finding Irwin concluded that the results of 
his earlier study were valid; item contamination had not compromised 
the  finding  that  reality  testing  deficits  predicted  belief  in  the 
paranormal. 
Irwin’s  (2003a,  2004)  results  suggest  that  reality  testing  deficits 
play a central  role in the formation and maintenance of paranormal 
beliefs. Irwin (2004) postulates that some people when faced with an 
anomalous  experience  may fail  to  thoroughly  critically  evaluate  the 
belief and hence,  may adopt a paranormal explanation. Irwin (2004) 
further evaluated his data and found that the reality testing deficits of 
the  sizeable  majority  of  ardent  paranormal  believers  were  below 
clinical levels. This finding was consistent with his earlier study (Irwin, 
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2003) and suggests that reality testing deficits in believers should be 
understood in terms of information processing style. Irwin and Young 
(2002) argue that people with an intuitive-experiential processing style 
will  be  predisposed  towards  accepting  paranormal  explanations 
because they find them appealing and therefore do not subject them to 
reality testing. Irwin (2004) argues that motivational factors,  such as 
need for control may be important for the maintenance of paranormal 
beliefs  (Irwin,  2000).  The  notion  being  that  the  paranormal  belief 
provides a sense of reassurance, thus reality testing is suspended and 
contrary  evidence  is  ignored  (Singer  &  Benassi,  1981;  Wiseman  & 
Smith, 2002).
The present study was designed with reference to the earlier work 
of Irwin (2003a, 2004). Particularly, the current study investigated the 
relationship between core facets of paranormal belief (NAP and TPB), 
reality testing and urban legends. The key question of interest being 
whether  Irwin’s  (2003a,  2004)  reality  testing  findings  could  be 
generalised  to  endorsement  of  urban  legends.  In  this  context  we 
considered Irwin’s recent definition of paranormality, “a proposition 
that has not been empirically attested to the satisfaction of the scientific 
establishment but is generated within the nonscientific community and 
extensively endorsed by people, who might normally be expected by 
their  society  to  be  capable  of  rational  thought  and  reality  testing” 
(Irwin, 2009, p. 16-17).  Using this definition it is evident that there is 
potential overlap3 between belief in the paranormal and acceptance of 
urban legends as true. Certainly, such accounts are generated within 
the nonscientific community, their veracity is rarely tested, and their 
existence is perpetuated by people, who might normally be expected 
by their society to be capable of rational thought and reality testing. 
These  characteristics,  together  with  inherent  plausibility  and 
believability suggested that urban legends would act as an excellent 
medium for further investigating paranormal belief and reality testing.
On this basis it was predicted that truthfulness ratings for urban 
legends  (both  individually  and  summated)  would  be  positively 
3 Overlap in this context,  refers not to content but to characteristics/attributes;  paranormal content is not a 
defining feature of urban legends.
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correlated with reality testing and belief in the paranormal. It was also 
hypothesized  that other  attributes  of  urban  legends  (retelling, 
likelihood,  importance,  scariness,  strangeness  and heard  by  others) 
would be related to belief  in  the paranormal  and reality  testing.  In 
addition to this in line with the findings of Irwin (2003a, 2004) it was 
anticipated that  urban legend endorsement  and level  of  paranormal 
belief would be predicted by reality testing deficits. More particularly, 
it was hypothesized that the size of the relationship between belief in 
the paranormal and the endorsement of urban legend veracity would 
be reduced if reality testing was controlled. 
Method
Participants 
One hundred and fifty-five respondents participated in this study. 
There were 48 males and 107 females. The mean age was 30.41 years 
(SD  =  11.08)  with  a  range  of  17–61  years.  Participants  included 
undergraduates  and  employees  from  the  Manchester  Metropolitan 
University (MMU) and volunteers from the wider community. Overall, 
58%  of  respondents  were  students  and  42%  non  students.  The 
proportion of students vs. non students for males was: 44% vs. 56%, 
and for females: 64% vs. 36%.
Participation  was  voluntary,  and  respondents  could  terminate 
their  participation at  any time during the  study. Respondents  were 
recruited  through  a  range  of  sources:  undergraduate  psychology 
classes,  contacts  at  local  colleges,  research  students  using  snowball 
sampling  (encouraging  contacts  to  take  part  in  a  study),  and 
advertisement  of  the  study  (emails  to  staff  and  students  at  the 
university and posters placed around the university campus).
Sampling 
The current study made use of internet-mediated research (IMR). 
This approach has been employed successfully in the past  (Dagnall, 
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Munley,  Parker,  &  Drinkwater,  2010b;  Dagnall,  Parker,  Munley  & 
Drinkwater,  2010a;  Wiseman  &  Watt,  2004).  IMR  was  used  in  the 
current  study  because  it  possesses  a  number  of  advantages 
(Whitehead, 2007): it enables a large pool of respondents to be tested, 
respondent access is facilitated, social barriers are reduced (Valaitis & 
Sword,  2005),  and  disclosure  is  often  enhanced  (Joinson,  2002; 
Weisband  &  Kiesler,  1996).  In  addition  to  this  respondents  can 
complete the measures in a comfortable and controlled environment at 
their own pace.
Some researchers have criticised IMR, particularly with regards to 
sampling  bias  and  the  validity  of  data  collected  (Whitehead,  2007). 
However,  IMR samples  have been found to mirror  those associated 
with more traditional research paradigms (Dagnall et al., 2010a, 2010b; 
Hewson, 2003; Wiseman & Watt, 2004).
Materials
Participants  were asked to complete in the following order:  the 
Urban  Legends  Questionnaire  (ULQ)  (see  Appendices),  this  was 
adapted from Fox Tree and Weldon (2007); the Reality Testing subscale 
of the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT — Lenzenweger 
et al., 2001), and the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS; Lange, et 
al.,  2000;  Tobacyk,  1988;  Tobacyk,  2004;  Tobacyk  &  Milford,  1983). 
Questionnaire order was the same for all participants.
The ULQ contained seven urban legends. Three legends (Kidney, 
Cactus and Cookie stories) were adapted from Fox Tree and Weldon 
(2007): “Kidney”, “Cactus”, and “Cookie” (see Appendices). Fox Tree 
and  Weldon  (2007)  used  four  legends,  however,  following  close 
examination of their materials it was decided to omit the Ethics story 
from the current study because it contained material that was pertinent 
to Psychology students.4 To ensure that participants were exposed to a 
range  of  urban  legends  four  further  examples  were  included: 
“Airbags”,  “Airplane”,  “Ricin”,  and  “Sandstorm”  (see  Appendices). 
Consistent  with Fox Tree and Weldon (2007) these additional  urban 
4 The current sample was not composed exclusively of Psychology students, however, it contained a significant 
number of respondents with experience of Psychology (current and previous students).
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legends were obtained from the Snopes online database of legends (at 
http://www.snopes.com). The only restriction on selection was that the 
legends should be from different categories. 
Each urban legend was followed by a series of questions based on 
Fox  Tree  and  Weldon  (2007).  One  question  measured  whether 
respondents had heard the story before and, if so, how many times and 
where. Another assessed whether respondents believed other people in 
the UK had heard the story (heard by others),  1 (almost no one) to 7 
(almost  everyone).  Respondents  were also asked whether  they would 
retell the story in the future (retelling), 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely  
likely).  Further questions assessed whether respondents:  believed the 
story was true (truthfulness), 1 (definitely not true) to 7 (definitely true); 
thought something like the story could happen to someone they knew 
(likelihood), 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely); believed that it was 
important to pass the story on (importance), 1 (not at all important) to 7 
(extremely important), considered the story to be frightening (scariness), 
1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely); and whether they believed the event was 
out of the ordinary (strangeness), 1 (not at all unusual) to 7 (extremely  
unusual).
Reality testing was measured using the Reality Testing subscale of 
the Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO-RT — Lenzenweger et 
al.,  2001).  The  IPO-RT  is  a  20  item,  unidimensional,  self-report 
measure,  which  assesses  aspects  of  reality  testing.  Responses  are 
recorded on a 5-point likert scale (1  never true to 5  always true), thus 
total scale scores range from 20 to 100, with low scores indicating high 
reality  testing  ability.  The  IPO–RT  was  designed  to  measure  “the 
capacity to differentiate self from non-self, intrapsychic from external 
stimuli,  and  to  maintain  empathy  with  ordinary  social  criteria  of 
reality” (Kernberg, 1996, p.120). Hence it includes items such as, ‘I can’t 
tell whether certain physical sensations I’m having are real, or whether 
I am imagining them’, and ‘When I’m nervous or confused, it seems 
like the things in the outside world don’t  make sense either’.  Irwin 
(2004)  argued  that  because  the  IPO-RT  places  an  emphasis  upon 
information processing style rather than psychotic symptomology it is 
consistent  with  Langdon  and  Coltheart’s  (2000)  account  of  belief 
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generation.  The  IPO-RT  has  been  validated  and  its  psychometric 
integrity  has  been  established.  Lenzenweger  et  al.  (2001)  report  the 
scale to be internally consistent and temporally stable with nonclinical 
populations. The IPO-RT has demonstrated good retest reliability (r = .
73) and has good construct validity (Lenzenweger et al., 2001). 
The R-PBS (Lange et al., 2000; Tobacyk, 1988; Tobacyk, 2004) is 
the  most  prevalently  used  self-report  measure  of  paranormal  belief 
(Irwin,  2004).  It  is  an amended form of  the Paranormal  Belief  Scale 
developed  by  Tobacyk  and  Milford  (1983)  and  contains  26-items 
assessing seven facets of paranormal belief: traditional religious belief, 
psi, witchcraft, superstition, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, and 
precognition. These items can be summated to produce an overall total, 
or scores for each belief facet can be used. However, purification of the 
scale to correct for differential item functioning (arising from age and 
gender  bias),  and  subsequent  factor  analysis  has  identified  an 
alternative  two  factor  solution  (Lange  et  al.,  2000).  This  comprises 
factors  measuring  New  Age  Philosophy  (NAP)  and  Traditional 
Paranormal Belief (TPB). NAP contains 11 items measuring belief in 
psi, reincarnation, altered states, and astrology, whilst the TPB assesses 
belief in concepts, such as the devil and witchcraft (Irwin, 2004). Items 
on the R-PBS are presented as statements (e.g., “there is a devil” and 
“witches do exist”) and participants respond on a likert scale ranging 
from  1  (strongly  disagree)  to  7  (strongly  agree),  with  higher  scores 
reflecting greater paranormal belief.  The current paper, in line with 
Irwin (2004), will be using the two-factor solution suggested by Lange 
et al., (2000). 
Recoding  the  scores  in  line  with  the  Rasch  scaling  procedure 
(Andrich, 1988b) produces scores ranging from 6.85 to 47.72 on NAP 
and 11.16 to 43.24 on TPB. Although there has been debate about the 
nature and number of belief dimensions contained within the R-PBS 
(Lawrence, 1995a, 1995b, Lawrence, Roe, & Williams, 1997; Tobacyk, 
1995a,  Tobacyk,  1995b,  Tobacyk  &  Thomas,  1997),  the  measure  is 
generally  considered  to  be  conceptually  and  psychometrically 
satisfactory (Tobacyk, 2004). Particularly, the R-PBS has been shown to 
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possess adequate validity (Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b, 2004) and good test-
retest reliability (Tobayck, 2004).
Results
Reliability and scale descriptives
The  two  Rasch  scale  factors  of  paranormal  belief  (New  Age 
Philosophy, NAP; and Traditional Paranormal Belief, TPB) identified 
by Lange et al. (2000) were used alongside overall R-PBS scores in the 
current paper (see Irwin, 2004)5. Internal reliability was assessed using 
Cronbach’s  alpha  (α).  The  R-PBS  (α  =  .94)  and  NAP  (α  =  .93) 
demonstrated excellent internal  reliability,  whilst  the Reality Testing 
subscale  of  the  Inventory  of  Personality  Organization  (IPO-RT; 
Lenzenweger, et al., 2001) (α = .87) and TPB (α = .82) were found to 
possess good internal reliability (George & Mallery, 2003) (descriptives 
for the survey measures are presented in Table 1).
Table 1. Summary statistics for the Reality Testing (IPO-RT) and Paranormal Belief (R-PBS amd 
ASGS) measures
Urban legend descriptives
For completeness mean attribute ratings for each urban legend are 
presented alongside overall ratings in Table 2. 
5 Prior to the use of parametric statistics, exploratory data analysis (EDA) was conducted. This revealed that 
IPO-RT scores were skewed and consequently a log transformation was performed (Irwin, 2004). Screening 
prior to analysis ensured that normality assumptions were not violated (Bulmer, 1965).
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      M        SD 
IPO-RT 32.5 10.01 0.87
R-PBS    44.1 30.91 0.94
NAP 19.64 6.65 0.93
TPB 20.99 6.29 0.82
  α
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Table 2. Urban legends: Individual and overall descriptives
Looking at attribute scores for each urban legend it is clear that 
there  is  significant  variation  across  the  stories.  All  attributes  were 
scored on a seven point likert scale. Scores on retelling ranged from 
Ricin (M = 1.91, SD = 1.31) to Kidney (M = 3.01 SD = 2.02). The overall 
mean (M = 2.42, SD = 1.14) was towards the lower end of the scale and 
indicated that respondents would be unlikely to retell the story in the 
future. 
Scores on truthfulness ranged from Airplane (M = 2.19, SD = 1.33) 
to Cookie (M = 3.25, SD = 1.71). The overall mean (M = 2.89, SD = 1.03) 
was below the mid-point of the scale and indicated that respondents 
did not generally believe that the stories were true. Scores  on 
likelihood ranged from Ricin (M = 1.46, SD = 0.96) to Cookie (M = 2.12, 
SD = 1.53).  The overall mean (M = 1.71, SD = 0.70) was at the lower end 
of  the  scale  and  indicated  that  respondents  did  not  think  that 
something like the story could happen to someone they knew. 
Scores on importance ranged from Airplane (M = 1.67, SD = 1.11) 
to Kidney (M = 2.61, SD = 1.66).  The overall mean (M = 1.97, SD = 0.93) 
was at the lower end of the scale and indicated that respondents did 
not think that it was important to pass the story information on. 
Scores on scariness ranged from Cookie (M = 1.25, SD = 0.71) to 
Kidney (M = 3.46, SD = 2.21). The overall mean (M = 2.23, SD = 1.11) 
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Kidney Cactus Cookie Airbag Airplane Ricin Sandstorm Total 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Retelling 3.01 2.02 2.76 1.93 2.12 1.59 2.05 1.35 2.95 1.9 1.91 1.31 2.10 1.42 2.42 1.14
Truthfulness 2.97 1.54 2.90 1.65 3.25 1.71 2.68 1.44 2.19 1.33 3.01 1.58 3.23 1.56 2.89 1.03
Likelihood 1.99 1.24 1.63 1.11 2.12 1.53 1.59 0.92 1.52 0.94 1.46 0.96 1.63 1.23 1.71 0.70
Importance 2.61 1.66 1.81 1.14 1.76 1.21 1.97 1.21 1.67 1.11 2.15 1.54 1.86 1.29 1.97 0.93
Scariness 3.46 2.21 2.90 2.06 1.25 0.71 2.03 1.51 1.47 1.09 2.37 1.71 2.13 1.59 2.23 1.11
Unusualness 5.57 1.73 5.54 1.78 4.32 1.88 4.76 1.93 5.63 1.81 4.80 1.80 4.59 2.03 5.03 1.47
Heard (UK) 3.06 1.53 2.34 1.18 2.30 1.29 2.13 1.13 2.39 1.44 2.14 1.18 2.37 1.25 2.29 0.93
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was at the lower end of scale and indicated that respondents did not 
rate the stories as frightening. 
Scores on unusualness ranged from Cookie (M = 4.32, SD = 1.88) to 
Airplane (5.63, SD = 1.81). The overall mean (M = 5.03, SD = 1.47) was at 
the upper end of the scale and indicated that respondents found the 
stories to be unusual. 
Finally, Scores on heard (UK) ranged from Airbag (M = 2.13, SD = 
1.13) to Kidney (M = 3.06, SD = 1.53).  The overall mean (M = 2.29, SD = 
0.93)  was  towards  the  lower  end  of  the  scale  and  indicated  that 
respondents thought that few other people in the UK had previously 
heard the story.
Paranormal Belief and Prior Exposure to Urban Legends 
The association between belief in the paranormal and previously 
hearing urban legends was  analysed using a  series  of  point-biserial 
correlations.  A  separate  correlation  was  performed  for  each  urban 
legend. Only the correlation between level of  paranormal belief and 
previously hearing the airplane story was found to be significant (see 
Table  3).  A  negative  correlation  was  observed,  indicating  that 
individuals with high levels of paranormal belief were less likely to 
report having previously heard the airplane story.




Yes No r p
Kidney 18 82 0.03 > .05
Cactus 13 87 -0.05 > .05
Cookie 12 88 0.06 > .05
4 96 -0.06 > .05
16 84 -0.21 = .004
5 95 -0.04 > .05
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Reality testing, paranormal belief and urban legend truthfulness
A series of Pearson product-moment correlations were performed 
between: the IPO-RT; the R-PBS, overall and two factors scores (NAP 
and TPB); and mean truthfulness ratings for each urban legend (see 
Table 4).
Table 4. Correlations for reality testing, paranormal belief and truthfulness ratings for urban legend 
endorsement
Whilst some variation was evident within the correlation matrix 
investigation revealed a clear pattern of results. Firstly, IPO-RT reality 
testing  scale  scores  were  found  to  positively  correlate  with  the 
truthfulness  ratings of  each urban legend. Secondly,  a  similar result 
was  found  for  R-PBS  scores  (overall  and  two  factor),  level  of 
paranormal belief positively correlated with urban legend truthfulness 
ratings, with the exception of the airbag story. Finally, despite failing to 
correlate with level of paranormal belief the airbag truthfulness ratings 
was positively correlated with the truthfulness ratings of other urban 
legends. These results indicate that the truthfulness ratings of urban 
legends are related to reality testing scores  and level of  paranormal 
belief.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 IPO-RT
2 R-PBS .43**
3 NAP .40** .89**
4 TPB .40** .86** .74**
5 Kidney .35** .21** .25** .14*
6 Cactus .20** .16* .17* .12 .32**
7 Cookie .17* .20** .17* .15* .26** .47**
8 .18* .12 .13 .11 .40** .41** .49**
9 .20** .19** .19** .21** .27** .27** .40** .36**
10 .17* .23** .26** .24** .33** .28** .36** .50** .43**




* p < .05; ** p < .01 (all probabilities one-tailed).
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Reality testing, paranormal belief and urban legends attributes 
A  further  series  of Pearson  product-moment  correlations  were 
performed between: the IPO-RT; R-PBS, overall scores and two factors 
scores (NAP and TPB); and the mean of each urban legend attribute 
(retelling,  truth,  likelihood,  importance,  scariness,  strangeness  and 
heard by others) (see Table 5).
Table 5. Correlations for reality testing, belief in the paranormal and urban legend endorsement
IPO-RT  and  R-PBS  were  positively  correlated  with  ratings  for 
truthfulness,  retelling  likelihood, importance,  scariness and heard by 
others. Negative correlations were observed between the unusualness 
rating  and  belief  in  the  paranormal  (overall,  NAP  and  TPB);  high 
paranormal  belief  scores  were  associated  with  lower  ratings  of 
unusualness.  No  correlation  was  found  between  the  unusualness 
rating and IPO-RT. Overall, with the exception of unusualness, these 
results  indicate  that  higher  scores  on  the  IPO-RT  and  R-PBS  are 
associated with higher ratings on each of the urban legend attributes. 
Similarly, with the exception of unusualness, urban legend attributes 
were found to be positively correlated with each other; scores on one 
attribute were related to scores on another. 
39










10 Unusualness  -.09   -.08 .04
11 Heard (UK) .11
  .43**
  .40** .89**
  .40** .86**    .74**
  .31** .21**   .18*    .24**
  .32** .28**    .29**    .25**   .72**
  .30** .22**   .18*     .23**   .55**   .54**
  .30** .25**    .23**    .27**   .77**   .70**   .67**
  .27** .20**    .20**    .21**   .61**   .62**   .45**    .61**
-.23**  -.19**      -.30**     -.14*      -.21**     -.15*
  .23** .26**    .25**    .22**   .28**   .22**   .41**    .28** -.16*
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (all probabilities one-tailed).
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Paranormal belief factors and reality testing
The relationship between the R-PBS paranormal factors (NAP and 
TPB) and IPO-RT was explored using partial correlation. A significant 
positive correlation was found between NAP and RT controlling for 
TPB; r = .17, df = 152, p = .021 (one tailed). A similar significant positive 
correlation was found between TPB and RT controlling for NAP; r =.17, 
df = 152, p = .020 (one tailed). Both paranormal factors were similarly 
related to IPO-RT.
Multiple regression and path analysis
Prior to performing multiple regression and path analysis positive 
correlations were found between: the R-PBS (IV1; independent variable 
1) and the dependent variable (DV; truthfulness of urban legends), r = 
.28,  df = 155,  p < .001; the R-PBS (IV1) and IPO-RT (IV2; independent 
variable 2),  r = .43,  df = 155,  p < .001; and IPO-RT (IV2) and the DV 
(truthfulness of urban legends), r = .32, df = 155, p < .001. 
Next a multiple regression using forward selection was performed. 
Forward selection enters the predictor variables into the model one at a 
time in an order determined by the strength of relationship between 
predictor and criterion. The selection method was used in the current 
study because it was predicted that IPO-RT would be more strongly 
correlated with mean urban legend truthfulness ratings. The forward 
method also enables the additive effect of subsequent variables to be 
identified. Before multiple regression was conducted multicollinearity 
was  assessed  using  the  variance  inflation  factor  (VIF)  (Mansfield  & 
Helms,  1982).  The observed VIF value (1.23)  (IPO-RT – R-PBS)  was 
within recommended tolerance; severe multicollinearity exists if a VIF 
is larger than 5 (Yang, 2007).
The significant predictors from each regression model are shown 
in Table 6.  
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Table 6. Factors predicting truthfulness ratings
IPO-RT was a significant predictor of truthfulness ratings, F(1, 153)  = 
17.05, p < .001, explaining 9% of the variance. Adding R-PBS scores to 
the model, F(2, 153) = 10.87, p < .001, accounted for additional variance; the 
amount of explained variance increased to 11%, R2 change = .03, F(1, 152) 
Change = 4.32, p = .039. 
Examination  of  the  partial  correlations  between  truthfulness 
ratings and IPO-RT (controlling for paranormal belief), r = .23, df = 152, 
p =  .001;  and truthfulness  ratings  and R-PBS (controlling  for  reality 
testing),  r =  .17,  df =  152,  p =  .01,  produced the expected pattern of 
results.  The  relationship  between  belief  in  the  paranormal  and 
endorsement of urban legend veracity declines when reality testing is 
controlled (see figure 1 for path analysis diagram).
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        Β         B (SE)         β t p
Step 1
Constant -1.13   .977  
IPO-RT .094 2.69 0.65 0.32 4.13 < .001
Step 2
Constant -0.44 1.02
IPO-RT .114 2.05   .715 .242 2.88 = .005
R-PBS   .006   .003 .175      .079    = .039
R2
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Figure 1. Path Analysis Diagram 
(Key: B = Unstandardised Coefficient, B(SE) = Standard Error of B, r = Correlation Coefficient.)
Discussion
It was predicted that urban legend truthfulness ratings (individual 
and overall) would be positively correlated with reality testing scores 
and belief  in the paranormal.  It  was also expected that other  urban 
legend  attributes  (retelling,  likelihood,  importance,  scariness, 
unusualness and heard UK)  would be associated with reality testing 
scores and belief in the paranormal. These hypotheses were supported 
for all attributes with the exception of unusualness. Unusualness was 
found  to  be  negatively  correlated  with  belief  in  the  paranormal 
(overall;  New  Age  Philosophy,  NAP;  and  Traditional  Paranormal 
belief, TPB), but not with reality testing; only higher paranormal scores 
were associated with lower unusualness ratings. This may be because 
the  stories  were  inherently  ‘strange’  and  therefore  less  likely  to  be 
affected by level of reality testing (M = 5.03, SD = 1.47; on a seven point 
scale). It is worth noting that the unusualness dimension produced less 
reliable  ‘inter-attribute’  correlations;  weak  relationships  were  found 
with  truthfulness,  likelihood,  importance  and  heard  (UK),  and 
unusualness failed to correlate with retelling and scariness. The reason 
for this difference merits further research.
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As hypothesised, controlling for reality testing reduced the size of 
the relationship between truthfulness  ratings and paranormal belief. 
This  finding supports  Irwin (2004,  2009),  who proposed that  reality 
testing  deficits  were  fundamentally  involved  in  the  formation  of 
paranormal beliefs (see also:  Alcock, 1981, 1995; Goode, 2000; Irwin, 
2004; Vyse, 1997; Zusne & Jones, 1982). With regard to interpretation of 
the  truthfulness ratings caution is required because ratings were  well 
below the scale mid-point  (M = 2.89,  SD = 1.03).  This indicates that 
respondents did not generally consider the urban legends to be true. 
Thus,  in  the  current  paper  reality  testing  scores  were  related  to 
truthfulness  ratings  to  the  extent  that  respondents  reporting  higher 
levels  of  reality  testing  deficits  were  rating  the  truthfulness  of  the 
urban legends higher.
If  we  extrapolate  Irwin’s  (2003a,  2004)  postulations  about  the 
formation and maintenance of paranormal beliefs to the present study 
this  may  be  because  respondents  scoring  higher  on  reality  testing 
deficits are less certain that the stories are untrue. To test this assertion 
an  additional  t-test  was  conducted  upon  truthfulness  ratings  for 
respondents  scoring  below (vs.  above)  the RPO-IT  median.  This,  as 
expected,  revealed that  respondents  scoring above the median (M = 
3.20, SD = 1.10) rated the truthfulness of the urban legends higher than 
respondents scoring below the median (M = 2.65, SD = 0.96), t = -3.45, 
df  = 153,  p < .001, Cohen's  d = .56 (medium effect size). This may be 
because respondents scoring higher on reality testing deficits were not 
subjecting  the stories  to  the same degree  of  critical  testing  as  those 
scoring lower (Irwin, 2003a, 2004). This notion is supported by  Irwin 
and Young (2002), who argue that people with an intuitive-experiential 
processing style form conclusions on the basis of their innate appeal 
rather than rational, systematic analysis. 
In  the  present  study  reality  testing  scores  were  found  to  be 
similarly related to both factors of paranormal belief (NAP and TPB). 
This finding is consistent with that of Irwin (2004), who reported that 
reality testing deficits predicted both dimensions of paranormal belief. 
Interestingly,  partial  correlation  controlling  for  overlap  between the 
two factors,  revealed only  small  positive  correlations  between NAP 
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and reality testing,  and TPB and reality testing (Cohen,  1988,  1992). 
This suggests that whilst reality testing may play an important role in 
the formation and maintenance of paranormal belief, other factors are 
also  important.  Indeed,  reality  testing  explained  only  18%  of  the 
variance in R-PBS scores leaving significant variance unaccounted for. 
This indicates that not all paranormal beliefs result from faulty reality 
testing  and  is  consistent  with  Irwin’s  (2004)  observation  that 
paranormal  beliefs  can be generated  in a  number  of  ways.  For  this 
reason future research is required to identify, which paranormal beliefs 
are best predicted by reality testing deficits.
Finding factors which predict belief in the paranormal is difficult 
because  there  is  no  agreed  definition  of  paranormality.  Indeed, 
paranormal  belief  as  measured  by  the  R-PBS,  encompasses  many 
subjects,  which  vary  in  plausibility.  This  also  applies  to 
parapsychology more generally, where there are debates about which 
topics should be included. The consequence of this lack of theoretical 
agreement  is  that  parapsychology  incorporates  a  diverse  range  of 
topics, some of which have an established history of empirical study 
and are informed by scientific evidence (i.e., extrasensory perception 
and  micro  psychokinesis),  whilst  others  have  been  less  rigorously 
investigated  (e.g.,  poltergeist  activity  and  alien  abduction),  or  are 
difficult to investigate scientifically (i.e., near death experience). This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that beliefs are informed by myriad 
sources,  which  range  in  creditability  from  highly  reliable  (e.g., 
academic  journal  articles)  to  highly  unreliable  (the  internet,  media, 
anecdote,  etc.).  Thus  not  all  paranormal  beliefs  can  be  tested  and 
appraised in the same way, nor can they be explained by faulty reality 
testing;  the  failure  to  discriminate  between  subjective  (intuitive-
experiential processing) and objective (rationale-analytical processing). 
The current  paper examined urban legends because the authors 
considered  they  shared  key  characteristics  with  paranormal  beliefs. 
This  hypothesis  was  supported  by  the  findings  that  urban  legend 
truthfulness ratings were predicted by paranormal belief (and reality 
testing) and that endorsement of other attributes positively correlated 
with paranormal belief  (and reality testing) scores.  This relationship 
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may  be  explained  by  referring  to  Irwin’s  (2009)  definition  of 
paranormality.  Like  paranormal  beliefs,  urban  legends  are  rarely 
subjected  to  scientific  scrutiny,  they  are  generated  within  the 
nonscientific community, and are extensively endorsed by people, who 
might normally be expected by their society to be capable of rational 
thought.  In  this  context  it  is  not  particularly  surprising  that 
endorsement of urban legends is related to level of paranormal belief. 
Similarly, this may also apply to endorsement of similar phenomena 
such as, conspiracy theories (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Sharp, 2008) and 
hoaxes.  Research  into  factors  effecting  the  endorsement  of  publicly 
shared/exchanged  information  is  important  because  findings  may 
extend to important mediums, such as news stories, public information 
(e.g.,  health  campaigns)  and  government  policies  (e.g.,  global 
warming).
In  summary,  the  paper  adds  to  the  growing  body of  literature 
exploring  the  relationship  between  reality  testing  and  belief  in  the 
paranormal. The results demonstrate that belief in the paranormal is 
predicted by reality  testing deficits  and supports  the work of  Irwin 
(2003a; 2004). This study also suggests that reality testing deficits are 
associated with related beliefs, such as those supporting the veracity of 
urban  legends.  Further  work  is  required  in  this  area  to  determine 
which particular  paranormal  beliefs  are  generated  by reality  testing 
deficits and to ascertain whether the results generalise to other related 
beliefs (e.g., conspiracy theories).  
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Appendices
Urban Legends for ULQ
1. Passage One (“Kidney”)
A growing concern among international human rights organizations is  the 
increasing  problem  that  in  countries  throughout  the  world  human  organs  are 
being taken from people without their consent and being sold on the black market. 
In some cases, the organs are taken from prisoners, or from very poor people and 
street children. In other cases people travelling alone are targeted.
The following warning was recently emailed to business travellers at major 
companies throughout the world:
Date: Monday, 3rd February 1997
Subject Travellers Beware!!
Dear Friends: 
I  wish  to  warn  you  about  a  new  crime  ring  that  is  targeting  business 
travellers. This ring is well organized, well funded, has very skilled personnel, and 
is  currently  in  most major  cities  and recently  very active in New Orleans.  The 
crime begins when a business traveller goes to a lounge for a drink at the end of  
the working day. A person in the bar walks up as they sit alone and offers to buy  
them a drink. The last thing the traveller remembers until they wake up in a hotel  
room bath tub, their body submerged to their neck in ice, is sipping that drink. 
There is a note taped to the wall instructing them not to move and to call 911. A 
phone is on a small table next to the bathtub for them to call. The business traveller 
calls  911,  who  have  become  quite  familiar  with  this  crime.  The  911  operator 
instructs the business traveller to very slowly and carefully reach behind them and 
feel if there is a tube protruding from their lower back. The business traveller finds 
the tube and answers, "Yes." The 911 operator tells them to remain still,  having 
already sent paramedics to help. The operator knows that the business traveller’s 
kidneys have been harvested. This is not a scam or out of a science fiction novel, it 
is real. It is documented and confirmable. If you travel or someone close to you 
travels, please be careful. 
Regards 
Jerry Mayfield Austin Ops Engineering Manager 
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2. Passage Two (“Cactus”)
It is well known that some types of animals and insects live inside plants. For 
example,  the corn earworm hatches  from eggs laid in corn silk,  and then lives 
inside the corn shuck eating the maturing corn kernels. The raspberry can maggot 
feeds  downwards  in  the  batches  of  “canes”  of  berry  plants,  causing  a  distinct 
drooping often referred to as “limberneck”. 
A particularly frightening example of the danger that can arise from insects 
that  live  in  plants  was  recently  reported.  A  woman  in  Scottsdale,  Arizona, 
purchased a potted prickly-pear cactus  from Orchard Supply and Hardware [a 
nursery]. The cactus has been imported from Mexico. She placed it near a south 
facing window in her living room. Several days later, the plant began to make a 
humming noise, almost inaudible at first, but gradually increasing in volume. As 
the humming got louder, the cactus began to move, and then began to vibrate. The 
woman became so frightened that she called, 911 [the emergency operator]. After 
hearing what was happening, the emergency operator urged the woman to take 
the plant outside immediately, and then to move a safe distance, keeping children 
or  pets  away  from  the  plant.  The  woman  followed  the  instructions,  quickly 
carrying the vibrating cactus out to her front lawn, and then she retreated to the 
safety  of  her  porch.  Soon  the  fire  department  [emergency  personnel]  arrived 
dressed in thick protective clothing. But before they could gather up the plant, it 
split in two releasing hundreds of young, deadly tarantulas into the woman’s yard.
3.  Passage  Three (“Cookie”)  
Trademarks,  patents,  and  copyrights  are  big  business,  and  many  that  we 
think are public property are not legally in the public domain. For example, the 
word Jell-O is  trademark,  and cannot  be  used for  every  gelatine  dessert,  even 
though many people would not know what to call the colourful concoction other 
than Jell-O. The song “Happy Birthday to You”, which has become conventional to 
sing at birthdays, is also privately owned; if a television show or movie wants to 
use it in a scene, they have to pay the owner a fee. 
Sometimes legal principles can conflict with common practice, as illustrated 
by [the following event] the following e-mail message currently being sent around 
the world:
From susanmk@goldfish.hyu.edu
Subject: Neiman-Marcus Secret Cookie Recipe
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I am forwarding this message to you in the hopes that you will forward it to 
everyone you have an e-mail address for. Post as often as you like wherever you 
like. It is my attempt to achieve justice via the internet.
A month ago, I was having lunch at Neiman-Marcu, the ritzy departmental 
store [a gourmet shop]. I thought that the chocolate chip cookie served with lunch 
was equally good, so I asked the waiter if I could have the recipe. He frowned and 
said that he could not give the recipe away, so I asked if I could buy it. He smirked 
and said “Yes, for two-fifty”. I said “OK, just add it to my tab.” 
This week [thirty days later] I got my VISA [credit card] statement and was 
shocked to see Neiman-Marcu chocolate chip recipe- $250. I called the Neiman-
Marcu accounting department and explained that when the waiter said ‘two-fifty’ I 
had thought $2.50 not $250. I offered to return the recipe and have the bill reduced. 
The accountant told said she was sorry, but that recipes are expensive and that 
Neiman-Marcu  [the  gourmet  shop]  needed  to  protect  its  interests.  The ease  of 
reproduction meant that once the recipe was bought, it could not be refunded.
So I decided to get my $250 worth and some justice by sending out this recipe 
to everyone I know, and I hope you will forward it to everyone you know (to get 
revenge,  the  woman  e-mailed  the  recipe  and  the  story  of  the  gourmet  shop’s 
treatment  of  her  to  everyone she knew,  and asked each person to forward the 
message to as many people as possible], or print it out and give copies away. 
Here it is:
1 cup butter 2 cups flour 12oz. chocolate chips
1 cup sugar 1 cup oatmeal 1 cup chopped mixed 
nuts
½ cup brown sugar ½ tsp baking soda
3 eggs 1 tsp baking powder
1 tsp salt
First Cream butter and sugar, then Beat in eggs. Combine dry ingredients and 
blend into batter by cupfuls. Mix in chocolate chips and nuts. Place one inch apart 
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4.  Passage  Four (“Airbags”)  
Police officers coming to the aid of motorists locked out of their cars are dying 
in freak airbag accidents. 
******SAFETY NOTICE******
One of  the  traditional  services  provided  to  the  motoring public  by  Police 
Agencies  and  tow  truck  operators  involves  assisting  those  operators  who 
unwittingly lock their keys inside their vehicles. Several types of devices are on the 
market  which allow an officer,  or tow truck operator,  to  unlock the vehicle by 
sliding a metal rod, commonly known as a "Slim Jim", between the door window 
and frame in  order  to  access  the control  rods which unlock the door lock and 
handle.  Once  unlocked,  the  owner  can enter  the  vehicle  and retrieve  the  keys. 
Many devices  have successfully  been  used for  this  purpose,  including the well 
known coat hanger. 
On  Wednesday,  December  3rd,  the  following  Officer  Safety  notice  was 




While  attempting to  gain entry  to  a  vehicle  with side impact  airbags  in a 
lockout, at least three Law Enforcement Officials have been killed using a Slim Jim 
Device.  Inadvertent  deployment  of  the  airbag  can  cause  the  Slim  Jim  to  be 
launched upward with great force. The force is strong enough to cause the device 
to penetrate the chin of the person attempting to access the vehicle, after which it 
can  continue on  to  become lodged  in  the  brain.  Even when lockout  assistance 
efforts do not prove to be deadly, the damage costs can be significant and may 
include thousands of dollars for replacement of the dashboard, which is designed 
to breakaway so as not to harm the driver or front passenger. The wiring for many 
of these side impact airbags is not shielded in any way, so a car opening tool can 
easily  damage  the  wiring,  causing  malfunction  or  possible  deployment  of  the 
airbag. 
Employees who find themselves in a situation where they need to get into a 
locked vehicle should be aware of the possible danger of deployment of the airbags 
for their own safety as well as the safety of others.
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5.  Passage  Five (“Airplane”)  
Tuesday January 22 8:58 AM ET 
A plane passenger is giving bottom marks to an airline after getting sealed to 
a toilet seat. The woman passenger  filed a complaint with Scandinavian Airlines 
System (SAS) after her ordeal on a Boeing 767 flight last year.
An American  woman had no need to fasten her  seatbelt  on a  flight  from 
Scandinavia to the United States after a high-pressure vacuum flush sealed her to 
the toilet seat of the transatlantic airliner. 
The passenger on the trans-Atlantic flight from Scandinavia (Olso) to New 
York  was  stuck  to  an  airline  toilet  for  more  than two  hours  when  flushing  it 
created a vacuum that sealed her bottom to the seat. The American woman used 
the  toilet,  but  pushed  the  flush  button  before  standing  up.  To her  horror,  she 
realised that the powerful vacuum action had got her in its grip. 
She “got sucked in after pushing the flush button while seated, activating a 
system to clean the toilet by vacuum” and “had to sit on the toilet until the flight 
had landed so that ground technicians could help her get loose”. Her body was 
sealed to the seat so firmly that it took airport technicians to free her.
6.  Passage  Six (“Ricin”)  
Drug  traffickers  are  hiding  small  amounts  of  the  deadly  toxin  ricin  in 
methamphetamine laboratories to kill law enforcement officers.
The Sacramento Regional Office of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement has 
offered this alert to all its personnel. The following alert has been confirmed and is 
being shared throughout the law enforcement and intelligence community. This 
alert  advises  that  nationwide  trend  among  drug  traffickers  is  to  "bait"  law 
enforcement officers with a white powder called RICIN. 
RICIN  is  a  derivative  of  Castor  beans  and  looks  like  powder 
methamphetamine. It is highly toxic and if it contacts human skin, it is fatal. The 
death  process  takes  several  days,  depending  upon  the  dosage,  and  is  almost 
impossible to detect during an autopsy. Forensic experts advise that if you field 
test RICIN in the Scott Reagent Kit, it will foam and bubble extensively. The test 
will also produce a gas that is very similar to mustard gas and can also be lethal if  
inhaled. RICIN is 6,000 times more lethal than cyanide and there is no antidote. 
Symptoms  of  contact  exposure  to  RICIN  are:  Fever,  cough,  weakness,  and 
hypothermia,  progressing to dangerously low blood pressure,  heart  failure and 
death. Due to this situation, in the event of suspect drug seizures, do not come into 
direct  skin contact  with any powdered  substances,  and exhibit  caution of  field 
testing any powdered substances. 
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We  are  forwarding  this  advisory  to  all  California  EMS  Agencies  and 
recommend  that  each  agency  contact  the  local  hospitals  in  their  area.  We  are 
unaware if RICIN can be detected on a toxicological exam. There is a potential for 
someone,  other  than  law  enforcement,  to  become  contaminated  with  this 
substance.
7.  Passage  Seven (“Sandstorm”)  
Sandstorm in Iraq reveals location of thousands of mines to U.S. troops.
In March, 2003, Coalition forces closing in on Baghdad were halted by severe 
sand storms that reduced visibility to less than 50 feet at times and threatened the 
effectiveness  of  weapons.  Troops also had to  deal  with mines  in the sand and 
snipers all the way to the Iraqi capital. 
Report from Marine Commander:
The order had come down at last. The ground invasion of Kuwait was about 
to commence. M Battalion would cross the Kuwaiti border as part of Operation 
Desert Storm. I was the second in command of 130 brave Marines who were about 
to face the most daunting challenge of their military lives. We’d already dodged 
heavy artillery fire and now we’d likely face more dangers, like land mines and oil 
fires. Thousands of Iraqi troops waited just beyond the Kuwaiti border. It was time 
for us to make the final strategic push. 
Dear God, I prayed, help me to lead my troops wisely. Watch over us. Keep 
us safe. I walked from one group of Marines to another, talking to them about the 
mission and trying to keep their spirits up. Hunched against the dry, biting desert 
winds, we wrote letters home. Maybe our last. Just before dawn the next morning I 
gave the order to  move out.  The skies were  clear.  We slung our gear  into our 
Humvees  and  began  advancing  toward  the  border.  I  felt  a  drop  of  rain,  then 
another. In a matter of minutes it was pouring. The rain came down hard and fast, 
so thick we could barely make out the desert landscape ahead of us. It went on for 
days. 
Each morning we’d awaken soaked to the bone after another night with only 
camouflage netting for cover. Bad enough we had the enemy to worry about. Now 
the elements were against us too. Father, please make this rain stop and protect us. 
The rain continued to pound us relentlessly until we finally neared the Kuwaiti 
border. There the battalion halted. On the other side, the enemy waited. Rain or no 
rain, we’d soon be going in. We awoke on the day of the invasion to clear skies and 
glorious sunshine. As we closed in on the border, we couldn’t help but stare at the 
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astounding sight  before  us.  The torrential  rains  had washed  away the  sand to 
reveal metal disks planted all across our path. It was an Iraqi minefield.
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A Parapsychological Perspective on a 
Recent Study of “Intuitions in the Workplace”
James Houran & Rense Lange
Integrated Knowledge Systems
Abstract
A recent study by Lange and Houran (2010) found evidence that  
intuitions in the workplace  are  related to transliminal processes,  
but  the  validity  of  the  sample’s  self-reported  intuitions  was  not  
specifically addressed. Thus, we examined the correlation between  
self-reported intuitions and the propensity to exhibit emotional and  
cognitive biases in the previously collected dataset (n = 889). The  
misattribution  hypothesis  was  not  confirmed;  in  fact,  intuitive  
experiences  were  associated  (r  =  .38,  p  <  .001)  with  a  lack  of  
confirmatory biases. The validity of intuitions is discussed in terms  
of  transliminality  deriving  from  enhanced  neurological  
interconnectedness  that  consequently  facilitates  a  confluence  of  
unconscious information from tacit knowledge, pattern recognition  
and perhaps a “future orientation” that involves psi.  Situational  
and  motivational  factors,  akin  to  experimental  effects  in  psi  
research,  contribute to the process.  Rasch scaling analyses found  
that  transliminality  and  intuition  form  a  continuum,  with  the  
highest  levels  of  transliminality  being associated  with  intuitions  
that are described as paralleling psychic ability. 






“The only real valuable thing is intuition.”
Albert Einstein
“Intuition comes very close to clairvoyance; it appears to be the extrasensory  
perception of reality.”
Alexis Carrel
Shamans,  mystics,  psychics and  hysterics —  historically  many 
cultures  worldwide  have  shown  special  interest  in  individuals  like 
these who have the ability to integrate or dissociate affect,  imagery, 
ideation  and  perception  (Kottack,  1987;  Ember  &  Ember,  1988). 
Similarly,  psychology  has  a  long  tradition  of  studying  “mental 
boundaries”  and  the  conditions  under  which  such  boundaries  are 
permeable (for an overview, see Lange, Thalbourne, Houran & Storm, 
2000).  This  subject  interests  researchers  beyond  the  fields  of 
parapsychology  and  transpersonal  and  abnormal  psychologies.  For 
example, cognitive and industrial-organizational psychologists actively 
study inexplicable knowings or realizations that sometimes occur in 
the  context  of  managerial  decision-making,  as  well  as  the  related 
phenomenon  of  “entrepreneurial  intuition”  (e.g.,  Eisenhardt  & 
Zbaracki,  1992;  Parikh,  Neubauer  &  Lank,  1994;  Eisenhardt,  1999; 
Bradley, 2006; La Pira & Gillin, 2006). Popular culture refers to these 
experiences or states as “flashes of inspiration, genius or intuition.” It 
might seem surprising that the analytical and rational mind of Albert 
Einstein would lend credence to intuitions, but there are a myriad of 
examples of intuition apparently playing a role in key discoveries in 
science  and industry –  including those  of  Einstein himself  (see  e.g., 
Conley,  2008).  Then  too  is  the  phenomenon  of  multiple  discovery 
(Koestler,  1970),  whereby  in  the  same  time-frame  different 
investigators  developed  the  same  idea.  Familiar  examples  are  the 
independent  discovery  of  differential  calculus  by  Newton  and 
Leibnitz,  and  the  independent  development  of  the  idea  of  natural 
selection by Wallace and Darwin (Reichenbach, 1959; Koestler, 1970). 
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Intuitive  ability  and  its  potential  applications  have  been  further 
popularized and legitimized in the popular press with publications like 
Malcolm  Gladwell’s  (2005)  bestseller,  Blink:  the  Power  of  Thinking  
without Thinking.
What is intuition?
Intuition essentially appears to be an unconscious confluence of 
affect,  imagery,  ideation  and  perception.  For  example,  Langley, 
Mintzberg,  Pitcher,  Posada  and  Saint-Macary  (1995)  concluded  that 
decision-making  processes  are  partially  driven  by  emotion, 
imagination and memories all collectively crystallized into occasional 
insights.  Eisenhardt  and  Zbaracki  (1992)  echoed  this  view  in  their 
multidimensional  approach  to  decision-making  encompassing 
bounded rationality, heuristics, insight and intuition. Moreover, most 
researchers  acknowledge  that;  (1)  intuitive  events  originate  beyond 
consciousness,  (2)  information  is  processed  holistically,  and  (3) 
intuitive perceptions are frequently accompanied by emotion (Shapiro 
& Spence, 1997; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). Sinclair and Ashkanasy 
(2005)  therefore  defined  intuition  as  a  non-sequential  information  
processing mode, which comprises both cognitive and affective elements and  
results in direct knowing without any use of conscious reasoning (cf. Simon, 
1987; Epstein et al., 1996; Shapiro & Spence, 1997). 
This  definition  does  not  explicitly  identify  the  source  of  the 
cognitive and affective contents of intuitions, and indeed there are two 
competing  views  on  this  issue  (Shirley  &  Langan-Fox,  1996; 
Boucouvalas, 1997). One view defines intuition as an  experience-based  
phenomenon that  draws  on  tacit  knowledge  accumulated  through 
experience and retrieved through pattern recognition (e.g.,  Isenberg, 
1984; Simon, 1987; Behling & Eckel, 1991; Brockman & Anthony, 1998; 
Klein, 1998). The second view is that these experiences follow from a 
more spontaneous,  natural  psychophysiological  ability that rely heavily 
on sensory and affective elements in the intuitive process (e.g., Bastick, 
1982;  Parikh  et  al.,  1994;  Epstein,  1998;  Petitmengin-Peugeot,  1999). 
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Sinclair  and  Ashkanasy  (2005)  proposed  a  general  model  that 
incorporates both mechanisms simultaneously.
It  is  important  to  note  that  intuitive  thinking  often  occurs  in 
situations  of  significant  ambiguity  or  uncertainty  (Isenberg,  1984; 
Burke & Miller, 1999) — such as situations where problems are poorly 
structured  (Behling  & Eckel,  1991)  or  involve  non-routine  decisions 
(Simon, 1960), where problems do not have existing precedents (Parikh 
et al.,  1994) or when an individual is  faced with conflicting facts or 
inadequate  information  (Agor,  1984).  Other  contributing  factors 
include  motivational  issues  like  the  perceived  importance  of  the 
decision  (Goodman,  1993)  and its  potential  impact  on  the  decision-
maker  (Kriger  &  Barnes,  1992).  Interestingly,  intuitive  thinking 
strongly  resembles  magical  thinking  and  paranormal  belief  and 
experience as these phenomena also thrive during situations of marked 
ambiguity  or  uncertainty  (e.g.,  Irwin,  1992;  Lange  & Houran,  1998, 
1999, 2000; Houran,  Irwin & Lange,  2001).  Moreover,  the situational 
and motivational  factors  associated with intuitions arguably parallel 
the  well-known  experimenter  effects  documented  in  the 
parapsychological  literature  (see  e.g.,  Schmeidler,  1997;  Watt  & 
Wiseman, 2002; Storm & Thalbourne, 2005). 
Transliminality and intuitions
We  recently  examined  the  idea  that  intuition  is  inherently  a 
transliminal  phenomenon.  Transliminality is  a  perceptual-personality 
variable that reflects the tendency for psychological material to cross 
(trans)  thresholds  (limines)  into  and  out  of  consciousness.  Reviews 
show that, in addition to paranormal belief and sometimes self-report 
and laboratory-based paranormal experience (Thalbourne & Houran, 
2003; Houran & Lange, 2009), the major correlates of transliminality are 
syncretic cognitions (Lange et al., 2000; Houran et al., 2006) – i.e., the 
fusion  of  perceptual  qualities  in  subjective  experience  such  as: 
physiognomic  perception (the  fusion  of  perception  and  feeling); 
synesthesia (the fusion of  sensory modalities)  and  eidetic  imagery (the 
fusion  of  imagery  and  perception).  Accordingly,  transliminality  is 
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conceptualized  as  enhanced  interconnectedness  between  brain 
hemispheres, as well as among frontal cortical loops, temporal-limbic 
structures  and  primary  or  secondary  sensory  areas  or  sensory 
association  cortices  (Thalbourne,  Houran,  Alias,  &  Brugger,  2001; 
Thalbourne, Crawley & Houran, 2003; Houran, Hughes, Thalbourne & 
Delin, 2006). Studies of perception, imagery and memory all provide 
evidence  for  a  threshold  that  mediates  unconscious-conscious 
awareness, and findings from several experiments are consistent with 
the  neurological  interconnectedness  model  of  transliminality  in 
particular (Crawley, French & Yesson, 2002; Houran et al., 2006; Fleck 
et al., 2008). 
There are compelling reasons to hypothesize that business leaders 
or visionaries who have “flashes of genius” or strong intuitions about 
key  decisions  or  discoveries  are  examples  of  transliminality 
manifesting  in  professional  or  occupational  contexts.  First,  the 
phenomenology  of  intuitions  summarized  above  agrees  with  the 
neurological interconnectedness model of transliminality and suggests 
that intuition is either caused or moderated by transliminality. Second, 
and  consistent  with  neurological  interconnectedness  model,  there  is 
preliminary  experimental  evidence  that  intuitive  processes  involve 
interactions among the frontal,  temporal, occipital and parietal brain 
areas,  and perhaps  even the  cardiovascular  system (McCraty  et  al., 
2004a,  2004b).  Finally,  Lange  and  Houran  (2010)  recently  found  a 
moderately  high  correlation  (r  =  .38,  p <  .001)  between  scores  on 
transliminality and scores on a measure of self-reported intuitions in 
the  workplace  in  a  sample  of  individuals  at  different  management 
levels.  However,  self-reported  intuitions  increased  with  higher 
management  level,  independently  of  transliminality.  These  findings 
are  consistent  with  a  two-mechanism  of  intuition  (cf. Sinclair  & 
Ashkanasy,  2005)  whereby  transliminality  equates  to  intuitive 
predisposition which is subsequently honed or reinforced over time by 
tacit  knowledge  that  comes  from  work  experience  or  structured 
training.  In  other  words,  intuitive  ability  might  build  upon 
transliminality, but it then goes beyond it somehow.
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We  suggest  that  greater  neurological  interconnectedness 
(Thalbourne  et  al.,  2001,  2003;  Houran  et  al.,  2006)  leads  to  more 
frequent, vivid and perhaps accurate intuitions. Further, we expect that 
intuitions  will  be  most  robust  when highly  transliminal  individuals 
have considerable tacit knowledge that has been accumulated through 
experience and retrieved through pattern recognition and at the same 
time  are  in  situations  conducive  for  intuitive  thinking  —  namely 
during situations where the outcome has strong personal relevance to 
the intuitive decision-maker and the situation is inherently ambiguous 
such  as  with  non-routine  decisions  or  ill-defined  problems  without 
existing precedents.
A potential Psi factor?
Intuitions as a transliminal and syncretic process that involve past 
and  present  stimuli  may  not  be  the  whole  story.  For  instance,  the 
findings of McCraty et al. (2004a, 2004b) give credence to the notion 
that  intuitive  processes  involve  interactions  among  the  frontal, 
temporal,  occipital  and  parietal  brain  areas,  and  perhaps  even  the 
cardiovascular system, yet these authors also reported evidence that 
experimental subjects show physiological responses to affective stimuli 
before such stimuli are even administered. Other studies with rigorous 
experimental  protocols  have  similarly  found  that  the  human  body 
often  responds  to  a  future,  emotionally-arousing  stimulus  several 
seconds  prior  to  experiencing  the  stimulus  (e.g.,  Bierman & Radin, 
1997; Radin, 1997; Bierman, 2000; Spottiswoode & May, 2003).
Of course, this leads to a major limitation in all self-report studies 
of  intuitions,  specifically  the  issue  of  the ontological  validity  of  the 
content of the respondents’  intuitions.  We attempted to address this 
issue to some extent in the wording of some of the questionnaire items 
that defined the Business Intuitions Inventory (BII: Lange & Houran, 
2010).  Confounds  like  emotional  or  cognitive  biases,  i.e., 
misattributions, can create illusions of “accurate intuitions” similar to 
the psychological mechanisms that can produce illusions of déjà vu or 
extrasensory perception (see e.g., Brown, 2004). On the other hand, the 
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growing body of empirical evidence consistent with the psi hypothesis 
(Irwin  & Watt,  2007)  and  specifically  presentiment  also  means  that 
consistently  accurate  intuitions  could  partly  or  fully  involve  psi  (cf. 
McCraty et al., 2004a, 2004b). Our methodology did not allow us to test 
the  latter  notion,  but  we  were  able  to  address  the  former  to  some 
extent.  This  paper  therefore  presents  the  results  of  analyses  not 
reported in-depth in Lange and Houran (2010).
In  particular,  the  Intuitive  Decision  Making  Profile  (Andrews, 
1999)  includes  two  sub-factors  that  measure  the  extent  to  which 
Emotional  Biases  and  Cognitive  Biases  influence  an  individual’s 
decision-making. High scores on Emotional Biases indicate an attitude 
of  openness  to  intuitive  thinking  and  feeling,  and  high  scores  on 
Cognitive Biases indicate an attitude that  reflects one’s  resistance to 
self-fulfilling prophecies or confirmatory information processing. The 
misattribution hypothesis would predict that self-reported intuitions in 
the workplace will correlate positively with scores on Emotional Biases 
and Cognitive Biases. 
Method
The  Lange  and  Houran  (2010)  study  was  designed  to  test  the 
relationships  among  Transliminality,  an  Intuitive  Decision-Making 
Style and Self-Reported Intuitions in the workplace. 
Participants 
Data  were  collected  from  members  of  a  large  and  free  social 
networking website.  Invitations  were  sent  randomly by the  website 
administration to 1300 members’  email  inboxes.  No incentives  were 
offered  and  participation  was  voluntary.  The  instructions  described 
participation as part of a larger study on intuitions, belief systems and 
the  permeability  of  mental  boundaries.  The  final  sample  (n =  889) 
consisted of 507 men and 382 women (Mean age = 33.4 years, SD = 29.2, 
range  =  17  –  73  years)  who  came primarily  from English  speaking 
countries  (USA  =  492,  UK  =  124,  Canada  =  219,  other  =  54). 
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Respondents’  were  also  asked  about  their  employment  and  the 
management level of their jobs. The breakdown was: “Currently not 
Employed as a Manager“ (control group) (n = 543), “Entry/Line Level” 
(n =  74),  “Middle  Management“  (n =  167)  and  “Senior  Level 
Executive/Company Officer” (n = 105). 
Materials
In  addition  to  the  demographic  information,  respondents 
completed three questionnaires in the order below:
The Revised  Transliminality  Scale (RTS:  Lange,  Thalbourne  et  al., 
2000,  cf. Houran,  Thalbourne & Lange, 2003):  This is a Rasch scaled 
version of Thalbourne’s (1998) original 29-item, true/false scale (Form 
B). Twelve items from the original scale are excluded from the scoring 
of  the  test  due  to  age  and  gender  biases.  However,  the  remaining 
seventeen  test  items  constitute  a  unidimensional  Rasch  (1960/1980) 
scale. These 17-test items share a common underlying dimension and 
span  seven  domains:  hyperesthesia,  (fleeting) hypomanic  or  manic 
experience,  fantasy-proneness,  absorption,  positive  (and  perhaps 
obsessional)  attitude  towards  dream  interpretation,  mystical 
experience and magical thinking. The Rasch reliability of the RTS is .82 
(Lange et al., 2000). Also, Thalbourne (2000) found the 29-item scale to 
have  a  test-retest  reliability  of  .88  (p <  .001)  over  seven weeks,  and 
further analysis (Houran et al., 2003) on this same data set showed that 
the 17-item RTS has a test-retest reliability of .82 (p < .001). 
Intuitive Decision Making Profile (IDMP: Andrews, 1999): This is a 
40-item questionnaire using a five-point Likert scale (anchored by “To 
a Very Great Extent” and “To a Very Small  Extent”) that  addresses 
three  proposed  factors  (and  eight  sub-factors)  of  an  intuitive 
processing mode: Resources and Readiness (“knowing with precedence”: 
three subscales of Knowledge and Experience,  Reflection, and Stress 
and  Time  Management  Techniques),  Overcoming  Blocks  to  Accessing  
Resources (“psychological biases”: three subscales of Emotional Biases, 
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Cognitive  Biases  and  Stress/Time  Pressures)  and  Practicing  Intuitive  
Decision Making (“pattern recognition”: two subscales of Recognizing 
patterns  and  Recognizing  Physical  Cues).  Andrews  (1999,  p.  31) 
provided  a  brief  description  of  the  technical  development  of  this 
questionnaire and a table of preliminary normative data. In our sample 
the Rasch reliabilities (see Wright & Masters, 1982) for the three factors 
listed  above  were  0.87,  0.59  and  0.50,  respectively  (ignoring  item 
misfit). 
Business Intuitions Inventory (BII): This is a 17-item questionnaire on 
self-reported experiences of intuitions in workplace settings. Questions 
were  designed  by  a  panel  consisting  of  social  and  industrial-
organizational  psychologists  and  employees  at  entry,  mid-
management and senior levels who claimed to have had frequent and 
accurate  intuitions in their  careers.  The question set  aimed to cover 
content  related  to  the  phenomenology  of  intuitions  identified  by 
Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005). The response format was a four-point 
Likert  Scale  anchored  by  “Disagree  Completely”  and  “Agree 
Completely.” Table 2 presents the questionnaire items, which show no 
statistically significant response biases for age, gender or management 
level and have a Rasch reliability of 0.83. 
Results
Main Findings
We refer interested readers to the main paper (Lange & Houran, 
2010)  for  a  report  and  discussion  of  the  main  results.  To  quickly 
summarize, the self-reported intuitions significantly correlated with an 
Intuitive  Decision-Making  Style  and  Transliminality  (see  Table  1). 
Gender  was  not  confirmed  as  a  consistent  predictor  of  intuitions. 
Further,  self-reported  intuitions  increased  with  higher  management 
level,  independently of  transliminality.  The findings were consistent 
with a two-mechanism of intuition whereby transliminality equates to 
intuitive  predisposition  which  is  subsequently  honed  or  reinforced 
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over  time  by  tacit  knowledge  that  comes  from work  experience  or 
structured training. 
Table 1. Pearson correlations (and significance levels) between scores on transliminality, intuitive 











.05 (ns) .06 (.06)
Business Intuitions 
Inventory (BII)
.02 (ns) .33 (.001)
Rasch scaling
We conducted  post-hoc Rasch scaling analyses (Rasch 1960/1980) 
for this paper to examine the extent to which intuitive and transliminal 
experiences overlap in a psychometric sense. By way of explanation, 
Rasch  scaling  is  considered  the  gold  standard  approach  to 
measurement  in  that  it  simultaneously  measures  items  and 
respondents,  and  it  does  so  in  a  common  metric  (called  logits; 
progressively  higher  logit  values  correspond to  higher  traits  levels) 
and at an interval-level of measurement (Bond & Fox, 2007). We found 
that  the  two  questionnaires  scaled  together  (see  Appendix),  which 
indicates that transliminality and intuition are phenomena that form a 
common factor or dimension. This finding offers strong psychometric 
support for Lange and Houran’s (2010) contention that intuitions can 
be modeled, at least partly, as expressions of transliminality.
The  Appendix  also  shows  how  the  qualitative  experience  of 
intuitions varies by level of  transliminality (low, medium, high).  As 
witnessed by the high correlation between items’ locations (r = .85, p < 
.001),  the  transliminality  Rasch  hierarchy  obtained  in  the  present 
sample replicated the transliminality hierarchy reported in Lange et al. 
(2000). It can be seen that low levels of transliminality are characterized 
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by basic physiological arousal such as experiences of racing thoughts 
and  psychological  absorption.  This  range  of  transliminality  is 
associated with general intuitive feelings, but these intuitions take on 
more relevance as the level of transliminality increases to the medium 
range. Medium transliminality involves more physical manifestations 
and  this  seems  to  correspond  to  intuitions  that  are  perceived  as 
particularly potent or accurate during times of psychological pressure 
or  stress.  This  might  mean  that  increased  physiological  arousal 
enhances  intuitive  ability,  which  would  explain  why  managers  are 
more likely to notice and especially to rely on intuitions during periods 
of  uncertainty,  ambiguity  and  conflict  (Simon,  1960;  Agor,  1984; 
Isenberg,  1984;  Behling  & Eckel,  1991;  Parikh  et  al.,  1994;  Burke  & 
Miller, 1999). Finally, the highest levels of transliminality produce the 
most anomalous form of intuitions — the type perhaps alluded to in 
Alexis Carrel’s introductory quote. Here the character and accuracy of 
the intuitions are equated with putative psychic ability. 
Discussion
The  quantitative  and  qualitative  results  presented  here  are 
consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  intuitions  in  the  workplace  are 
transliminal  in  nature  and  that  a  neurological  interconnectedness 
model  is  a  parsimonious  explanation  for  an  individual’s  intuitive 
predisposition — a predisposition that seems to be bolstered by state 
and  trait  variables  very  similar  to  experimenter  and  milieu  effects 
documented  in  psi  studies.   Further,  the  qualitative  themes  in  the 
psychometric  transliminality-intuition  continuum  nicely  corroborate 
previous  empirical  work  that  shows  a  positive  correlation  between 
transliminality and paranormal  belief  and ostensible  experience (see 
Thalbourne & Houran, 2003). It also implies that the highest levels of 
transliminality might promote intuitive thinking to the point whereby 
the confluence of affect, imagery, ideation and perception also includes 
psi. 
Drawing on the provocative experimental work and conclusions of 
McCraty et al. (2004a, 2004b) and other prestimulus effect researchers, 
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it may be that the holistic model of intuitions proposed by Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy  (2005)  should  take  into  account  more  than  just  tacit 
knowledge  and  pattern  recognition  and  natural  intuitive 
predisposition. These variables arguably are grounded in a past and 
present “focus,” respectively. The most vivid and accurate intuitions 
may also involve a “focus” on the future, and this is where psi would 
play a role. McCraty et al. (2004b, p. 333) regard the term intuition as an 
updated  synonym  for  the  traditional  concepts  of  precognition or 
presentiment.  But  whereas  precognition  and  presentiment  imply  a 
conscious knowing, current models of intuition, including Sinclair and 
Ashkanasy  (2005)  and McCraty  et  al.  (2004a,  2004b),  make no  such 
requirement. Thus transliminality could be the primary mechanism by 
which conventional stimuli and psi stimuli are collectively gathered, 
synthesized  and  processed  into  an  eventual  conscious  awareness. 
Situational  and  motivational  factors,  including  tacit  knowledge  and 
pattern recognition, may then simply help to fill the available “pool “of 
cognitive and affective stimuli, as well as to prioritize or to filter such 
stimuli.
It  might  prove  beneficial  to  screen  and  select  subjects  for  psi 
experiments (e.g., Bierman & Radin, 1997; Radin, 1997; Bierman, 2000; 
Spottiswoode  &  May,  2003)  and  psychophysiological  studies  of 
intuition (e.g.,  McCraty  et  al.,  2004a,  2004b)  based on questionnaire 
levels of transliminality and self-reported intuitions in tandem. It can 
be  argued  that  more  popular  questionnaires  of  thin  boundary 
functioning  might  be  more  useful  for  this  purpose.   Concurrent 
validity studies and alternative approaches are always welcome, but it 
should  be  emphasized  that  the Revised Transliminality  Scale  is  not 
merely a “hodgepodge” of previously established scales.  Rather,  the 
development and validation of the RTS (e.g., Lange, Thalbourne et al., 
2000)  revealed  that  previous  measures  of  anomalous  or  aberrant 
feelings and cognitions were redundant and could be subsumed within 
the higher order factor of thin boundary functioning. 
Moreover, the RTS strongly correlates with scores on other thin-
boundary measures like Hartmann’s Boundary Questionnaire and the 
O-LIFE  (Houran,  Thalbourne  &  Hartmann,  2003;  Thalbourne  & 
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Maltby,  2008),  but  unlike  these  instruments  the  RTS  has  superior 
psychometric  quality based in Item Response Theory and scores are 
significantly related to performance on psychophysical threshold tasks 
using visual and vibro-tactile stimuli (Crawley et al., 2002; Houran et 
al., 2006). Thus, there are strong arguments for using the RTS in future 
research on transliminality and intuition. High scorers on both the RTS 
and  the  Business  Intuitions  Inventory  would  suggest  both  a  strong 
intuitive  predisposition  and  the  presence  of  critical  situational  and 
motivational factors that lead to a future focus – and hence an inherent 
inclination to “scan the future” for information to complement one’s 
current  tacit  knowledge  and  pattern  recognition  abilities.  We  are 
actively testing this idea ourselves and will report on the findings in a 
future paper. 
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Table showing the Rasch hierarchy of the transliminality-intuition continuum (lower  
logits indicate higher endorsement and lover trait levels)
Rasch hierarchy Rasch Logit 
Value 
Low Transliminality Range
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): Those who know 
my work best would say that my gut feelings about 
work decisions are extremely accurate. 
-1.36
Transliminality (RTS): While listening to my 
favorite music, in addition to feeling calm, relaxed, 
happy, etc., I often have a feeling of oneness with the 
music, or of being in another place or time, or vividly 
remembering the past
-1.31
Transliminality (RTS): My thoughts have sometimes 
come so quickly that I couldn’t write them all down 
fast enough
-1.21
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): People at work 
often come to me for personal advice because they 
regard me as very perceptive or wise.
-1.21
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): In general, my 
decisions at work are much more affected by 
industry experience and lessons learned than by the 
results of formal research and systematic evaluation 
of alternatives.                                
-1.08
Transliminality (RTS): I can clearly feel in my 
imagination such things as the feeling of a gentle 
breeze, warm sand under bare feet, the softness of 
fur, cool grass, the warmth of the sun and the smell 
of freshly cut grass
-0.74
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): More often than 
not, effective solutions to important work problems 
spontaneously flash into my mind.
-0.74
Transliminality (RTS): A person should try to 
understand their dreams and be guided by or take 
warnings from them
-0.72
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): I am extremely 




even when I do not have all the hard facts or data at 
the time.  
Transliminality (RTS): I have gone through times 




Transliminality (RTS): A the present time, I am very 
good at make-believe and imagining
-0.49
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): I usually know 
the right decision at work before anyone decides 
what to do.
-0.49
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): My gut decisions 
at work are almost accurate when I am under 
pressure.
-0.42
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): I take important 
risks at work when my gut instinct or intuition tells 
me to.
-0.32
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): Typically I do not 
know where my best work ideas come from -- they 
just come to me.  
-0.26
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): I seem to know 
what customers or clients want before they even do.  
-0.25
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): My unpopular 
opinions about important business strategies almost 
always turn out to be correct.
-0.14
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): My best ideas or 
decisions usually happen when I am under 
significant pressure at work.  
-0.06
Transliminality (RTS):  I have sometimes sensed an 
evil presence around me, although I could not see it.
0.01
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): The best ideas I 
come up with at work tend to come to me as intense 
or vivid thoughts, feelings or images.
0.05
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): My best ideas or 
decisions usually come in the middle of a work crisis.
0.06
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): I am surprised at 
how often I get flashes of genius when it comes to 
my work.
0.09
Transliminality (RTS): It is sometimes possible for 
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me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and 
to feel as if my whole state of consciousness has 
somehow temporarily been altered.
0.23
Transliminality (RTS): Often I have a day when 




Transliminality (RTS): I think that I really know 
what some people mean when they talk about 
mystical experiences
0.37
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): Sometimes I feel 
that have the uncanny ability to predict or know the 
future when it comes to important work decisions.
0.6
Intuitions in the Workplace (BII): Subordinates, 
peers or supervisors have joked or commented that I 
must have psychic ability, because I tend to know 
exactly the right thing to do at work.
0.65
Transliminality (RTS): I sometimes have a feeling of 
gaining or losing energy when certain people look at 
me or touch me
0.67
Transliminality (RTS): I have experienced an altered 
state of consciousness in which I felt that I became 
cosmically enlightened
0.78
Transliminality (RTS): At times I perform certain 
rituals to ward off negative influences
0.82
Transliminality (RTS): I have experienced an altered 
state of consciousness which I believe utterly 
transformed (in a positive manner) the way I looked 
at myself
0.83
Transliminality (RTS): I have felt that I had received 
special wisdom, to be communicated to the rest of 
humanity
1.14
Transliminality (RTS): When listening to organ 
music or other powerful music, I sometimes feel as if 
I am being lifted up into the air
1.33
Transliminality (RTS): For several days at a time I 
have had such a heightened awareness of sights and 
sounds that I cannot shut them out
1.5
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Abstract
The  report  here  concerns  an attempt  to  subliminally  prime film  
clips with participants prior to their ganzfeld  sessions. In total, 64  
trails (32 traditional psi ganzfeld trials and 32 comparison trials  
with  primed  targets)  were  conducted  with  receiver-sender  pairs  
taking part in a digital real time ganzfeld. Prior to the session, the  
receiver-sender  pairs  viewed  thematic  material  from  all  four  
potential  film  clips  presented  at  40  milliseconds  exposures.  
Although there was clear evidence from the results that the imagery  
from the  clips  later  re-emerged  as  a  major  part  of  the  ganzfeld  
imagery, this appeared to concern the non-target clips more than as  
the target material.  First place rankings on the target  clips gave  
only  13.7%  hits  (MCE  25%)  and  it  may  well  be  that  the  
methodology overloaded the participants with dynamic material to  
work through in the mentation.  
Introduction
 
In  his  introduction  to  The  New  Unconscious,  a  book which 
benchmarks the progress of experimental research in this area, James 
Uleman  writes:  “Over  the  past  decade  or  two,  a  new  picture  of 
unconscious processes has emerged from a variety of disciplines that 
Correspondence details: Professor Adrian Parker, Department of Psychology, Gothenburg University, 
Box 500, SE 405 30, Gothenburg, Sweden. Email: adrian.parker@psy.gu.se.
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are  broadly  part  of  cognitive  science.  Unconscious  processes  seem 
capable of doing many things that were, not so long ago, thought of as 
requiring mental resources and conscious processes.” (Ulleman, 2005: 
p.  3).   Although the formulation “perception without  awareness”  is 
sometimes  preferred  (Greenwald,  1992)  to  that  of  subliminal 
perception,  it  would  seem  that  the  area  has  following  decades  of 
controversy,  finally  gained acceptance.  Since  the  progress  that  been 
made  in  this  area  has  been  attributed  to  multidisciplinary  research 
(Hassin, Uleman,& Bargh, 2004), this provides also an opportunity for 
parapsychological research to contribute its findings to this new and 
growing knowledge base. 
 From the early days of psychical research onwards, there has been 
evidence that psi is largely an unconscious process. J. B. Rhine and his 
co-workers concluded in their monograph Extrasensory Perception After  
Sixty Years that the experimental studies of ESP and confidence calls 
indicated that psi is entirely an unconscious process (Rhine et al, 1940: 
chapter  XIV).  This  was  not  say  that  are  not  the  psi  conducive 
conditions that are regarded as a means of influencing its conscious 
manifestation  (Rhine,  1948).  Some  of  the  later  work  on  psi  and 
perception  without  awareness  has  been  reviewed  by  Stuart  Wilson 
(2002):  Wilson  notes  that  the  methodology  used  in  cognitive 
psychology, of influencing recognition memory of subliminal images, 
can  be  applied  in  parapsychology  and  it  is  this  principle  which 
underlies the present study to be reported.
Seen in a broader context, there are several somewhat convergent 
lines of contemporary research which lend conceptual validity to the 
idea of the unconscious mediation of psi.  Attempts to make use of the 
Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) were based on the idea that a greater 
openness  to  subliminal  stimuli  would  relate  to  greater  openness  to 
extrasensory  signals.  Indeed  different  measures  of  vigilance  and 
defensiveness have been found to relate consistently to those of ESP 
scores (Watt, 1990). One complicating factor in evaluating this area of 
research is that many of the findings with the DMT may be due to an 
anomalous  (possibly  itself  psi-based)  experimenter  effect  and  there 
appears  to  be  a  decline  in  the  effect  (see  Haraldsson,  Houtkooper, 
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Schneider, & Bäckström, 2002). Moreover the last study (Parker, 1993) 
which  used  Martin  Johnson,  the  main  proponent  of  the  defense 
mechanism  in  parapsychology,  in  order  to  judge  the  defense 
mechanism  records  of  participants,  failed  to  replicate  the  earlier 
findings.
Another approach to the area concerns how primed emotionally 
loaded targets can influence choices or preferences at an unconscious 
level and that such influences can occur either proactively in the case 
of presentiment (Radin, 1997) or retroactively in the case of retroactive 
inhibition  (Parker  and Sjödén,  2010,  Bem,  2010).  This  area  provides 
conceptual support for the effectiveness of emotional target material in 
an ESP task being primed at an unconscious level.
From the point of view of gaining access to unconscious processes, 
the work with the Ganzfeld can be regarded as a means of facilitating 
such processes  in forming the content  of  the altered state,  although 
there is actually little empirical work on this. Since the findings with 
the ganzfeld continue to be promising (Storm, Tressoldi, & Di Risio, 
2010)  but  primarily  with  selected  participants,  this  was  the 
methodology of choice here. Participating individuals were selected for 
their psychic belief and experiences. The target film clips were chosen 
because of their apparent emotional content and we wished to explore 
if these could be made more effective when they were primed prior to 
the ESP session in the participants’ unconscious processes or so-called 
“perception without awareness”.
There  has been some discussion in the literature on priming of 
subliminal targets, if the ESP task should be an implicit one (in which 
the  participant  does  not  know  about  the  psi  task  and  the  process 
would  then  be  non  intentional)  or  an  explicit  one.   Previous  work 
(Watt, 1993; Stuart, 2002) may be interpreted as indicating the implicit 
task  is  actually  less  likely  to  succeed.  For  this  reason  we  chose  to 
inform the participants about the nature of the task although they were 
not fully informed about as to why we were priming the target clips. 
The aim here was to use the ganzfeld as a means of producing the 
potentially psi-conducive state in these individuals. The unique feature 
that occurred in the design here, is that the range of target film clip 
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material (standard to most modern ganzfeld designs) was first primed 
in the receivers, that is the potential targets were all presented close to 
the subliminal threshold prior to the ganzfeld period. The rationale is 
that  if  the  material  is  already  available  or  primed  in  unconscious 
processes, it maybe more accessible to psi.
In carrying out this procedure, we would also be experimentally 
studying  if  unconscious  material  can  shape  the  content  of  the 
subsequent  occurring  altered  state  of  consciousness.  This  is  an 
assumed relationship which has been given much lip-service but for 
which there is actually a paucity of experimental studies showing it. In 
practice, the design of the study meant evaluating to what extent the 
film imagery, which had been subliminally presented to participants 
prior  to  the  ganzfeld  session,  would  later  re-appear  as  part  of  the 
content of the ganzfeld imagery in the form of parts of the mentation 
report. 
The technique we developed for this necessitates a priming session 
to be carried out prior to ganzfeld. Since two-minute film clips are the 
standard  target  material,  we had  to  find  means  of  presenting  their 
essence at an exposure level close to or below conscious perception. 
Sets of representative thematic picture sequences were chosen for this 
purpose much in the same that modern previews of commercial films 
are often shown.
This  procedure  meant  that  during  this  priming  session,  the 
essential frames of the four film clips in the standard ganzfeld were 
presented at an exposure speed close to the threshold for conscious 
recognition.  This  is  about  60  milliseconds,  depending  on  the 
complexity of the exposed material used. Evidently, this recognition 
threshold will show much individual variation and be influenced by 
the variations in the complexity  of  the content  of  the film material. 
However,  because of the limited resources  available to us,  we were 
unable to make individual assessments and we opted for a ‘one size 
fits  all’  approach.  This  meant  there  would be  some ambiguity over 
whether or not the material was truly subliminal and for this reason 
we prefer  to  use  the  term “sem-subliminal”.  A check was  however 
preformed on the effectiveness of the procedure by asking participants 
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following each clip exposure,  to  draw what  they saw.  In  nearly  all 
cases at most very fragmented images were recalled.
Since  this  unique  feature  of  the  design  in  terms  of  priming, 
constitutes a major deviation from the standard ganzfeld (Storm et al , 
2010),  the study was not  intended to be replication of  the previous 
findings but was exploratory in design and purpose. Nevertheless it 
should  be  noted  that  one  of  the  very  first  ganzfeld  studies  (Smith, 
Tremmel  and  Honorton,  used  a  design  in  which  the  sender  either 
viewed a target slide continuously for 10 minutes or else subliminally 
(tachistoscopically) for 1 millisecond and it was only the later aspect of 
the design that gave the significant findings. By contrast in the project 
to be described more fully  below,  the receiver  and sender  are  both 
primed with the target material prior to the sending period.
Aside from the priming aspect, the experimental procedure here 
conformed to the digital real time ganzfeld test used in the Gothenburg 
laboratory.  Pink  noise  was  used  as  the  source  of  the  ganzfeld 
stimulation given to the participant in the role of the receiver. During 
this,  the  ganzfeld  relaxation  period,  the  sender  was  located  in  a 
separate room about  30 metres  remote from the sender.  The sender 
viewed at a normal exposure during this period one of the four film 
clips  selected  as  the  target  by  the  randomisation  program  of  the 
computerised set up. Full details of the procedure, the program, and 
the precautions against potential sources of error and deception have 
been detailed elsewhere (e. g., Parker, 2000; Goulding et al 2004). 
In  the  Gothenburg set  up,  we have used a  traditional  receiver-
sender psi or GESP methodology as the starting point. However, some 
recent findings (Roe, Sherwood and Holt, 2004) indicate that the sender 
may  not  be  a  necessary  component  but  rather  a  psychologically 
advantageous  one.  The  sender  was  retained  here  because  of  the 
expectancies  of  having a sender in an ESP experiment appear to be 
embedded in the population we are using. 
One distinctive feature of the Gothenburg Ganzfeld is to use the 
real time digital recordings of the reported mentation images from the 
receiver. Another important feature of the procedure is that it enables 
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the  use  of  a  double  session  one  of  which  can  serve  as  a  control 
comparison.
The  control  series  can  be  enabled  because  the  programming 
requires that the sender views successively  two  film clips rather than 
one. In effect this means there are then two trials per session and that 
each  two-minute  target  film  clip  is  shown  7  times  giving  a  total 
viewing time of 14 minutes along with a two minute interval between 
the clips during the 30 minute ganzfeld period. This dual session had 
the  advantage  that  it  allowed  us  to  use  one  set  of  films  as  the 
experimental set and the other as the control set.  
For the study here, the experimental set in each session is defined 
as that belonging to the set previously subliminally presented and in 
this study it is the set which has been “primed”.  The control set of 
clips is non-primed and serves thereby as a comparison. Both film clips 
and  the  sets  of  four  films  which  they  belonged  to,  were  randomly 
selected  by  the  computer  randomisation  programme.  The  order  for 
part of the session that was to be the primed clip, was also randomised.
Our hypotheses predicted that the content of the mentation reports 
will  relate  to  the  sets  of  films  that  were  primed  and  can  be 
distinguished from the non-primed set and the that the reports will 
have a psi-mediated content which will enable the target film clips to 
be chosen with an effect size consistent with previous ganzfeld studies. 
         
Method
Design
In designing a procedure to subliminally present, that is to prime 
the  film  clips,  a  limiting  factor  concerns  the  refreshment  time  for 
computer monitor screens. Since each film length is 120 seconds, and 
the  standard  used  for  films  is  25  frames  per  second,  then  this  is 
potentially  3000  frames.  Limits  are  imposed  by  refresh  rates  and 
thematic continuity. To resolve this, the Inquisit software was utililised. 
Inquisit includes a procedure for enabling the subliminal exposure of 
pictures inserted into the program. Our requirement was to provide 3 
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frames  per  picture  for  the  75  Hz  monitor  at  an  exposure  of  3/75 
seconds, that is 40 milliseconds, which is slightly below the threshold 
for conscious recognition  (usually given as around 60 milliseconds). 
Twenty-four  pictures  were  exposed  for  40  milliseconds  making  the 
exposure time for each film sequence close to 1 second. As mentioned 
earlier, various factors, including individual variation, the complexity 
of the content of the film clip and the thematic connections between 
pictures,  all  meant  there  was  an  uncertainty  as  to  whether  the 
exposures  were,  in  each individual  case,  truly  subliminal.   For  this 
reason the term semi-subliminal may be more accurate; we termed the 
procedure the rapid thematic picture presentation test.
Participants
Thirty-two  participants  receiver-sender  pairs  took  part  in  the 
experiment  on  a  volunteer  basis.  Each  pair  contributed  one  session 
except for one individual who returned for a second session in the role 
of  receiver.  Participants  were  recruited  through  advertising  at 
meetings and notice boards for  New Age and spiritualistic  societies 
and  in  a  few  cases  through  personal  contacts.  The  majority  of 
participants came as pairs but in two cases staff took the role of sender. 
In all,  there were eight male-female receiver-sender pairs;  and eight 
female-female pairs. The age range was between 18-60 with a mean of 
31.  The  entry  criterion  for  talking  part  in  the  study  was  personal 
experience and belief in psi. This entry criterion was formally assessed 
by using the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale  for which a score of at least 1 
standard deviations above the mean was required in order to take part 
in the study. 
Since  each  session  gave  two  trials,  there  would  normally  have 
been a total number of trials as 64 but one session had to be cancelled 
due  to  technical  failure  in  the  equipment.  A  further  session  was 
eliminated  prior  to  the  knowledge  of  the  outcome  because  of  the 





Twelve sets  of  four film clips  from our  digital  film clip  library 
were used for the current project. The sets were chosen on the basis of 
their  maximum  dissimilarity  from  each  other  and  apparent  strong 
emotional  loadings.  The  resulting  forty-eight  film  clips  were 
individually  analysed  in  order  to  produce  representative  thematic 
pictures which were then added to the picture material in the Inquisit 
program for the purpose of priming them. These film clips were then 
also been given to an external judge who wrote a simple blow-by-blow 
content  description  for  each  film  clip.  These  content  descriptions 
provided  the  basis  for  a  later  assessment  of  matches  between  the 
mentation imagery and that of each control and each experimental film 
clip.
Procedure
The experimental procedure required both the receiver and sender 
to  place  themselves  directly  in  front  of  the  monitor  and  view  the 
randomly selected set of 4 film clips. Following the viewing of each of 
the primed film clips,  the participants sketched what they had seen 
and wrote notes on any feelings that were aroused by the material. The 
participants  were  not  told  fully  about  the  purpose  of  the  priming 
procedure until after the ganzfeld session was completed, whence they 
were fully debriefed. 
The sketches and notes from the priming formed the basis for the 
later assessment by an external judge who had the task of identifying 
the objective correspondences between the film clips used for priming 
and the subsequent content of the mentation reports. On the basis of 
the  assessment  of  this  content,  the  judge  would  then  attempt  to 
identify which part of the mentation reports related to the primed trials 
and which parts were unrelated and therefore may have belonged to 
the non-primed trials.
The participant in the role of receiver spent 30 minutes in ganzfeld 
stimulation  but  using  pink  noise  instead  of  ocean  waves  as  the 
auditory source.  Following the ganzfeld relaxation, the experimenter 
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who had accompanied the receiver, logged into the computer in the 
receiver room and located on the server the set of films that had been 
used to generate the choice of the first target film. The mentation report 
was then reviewed along with each of the four film clips (three dummy 
clips long with the target clip) in the set.  Each film clip was finally 
rated on a 0 to 99 point scale for its likeness to the mentation. This 
procedure was then repeated for the second target set of four clips in 
the session.
During  the  assessment  of  the  correspondences  between  the 
ganzfeld imagery and the primed film thematic pictures, the matches 
were  classified  as  “direct  correspondences”  and  as  “associative 
correspondences”.  The  method  was  partly  based  on  the  work  of 
Moulton  (2001):  By  identifying  each  meaningful  utterance  from the 
mentation report, Moulton  was able to assess their correspondence to 
a checklist of single words that had been earlier determined as being 
commonly  associated  for  each  target  photo  as  descriptors  of  each 
photo. Essentially the same method was used here after having first 
determined that an objectivity could be reached concerning what was a 
direct correspondence contra an associative one. 
Results 
It  had  been  planned  to  analyse  the  whole  series  of  mentation 
reports with a view to identifying correspondences with the primed 
material. However financial and time restrains dictated that we were 
able only to use a random sample. On the basis of the random sample 
of eleven mentation reports, the external judge was able, as predicted, 
to distinguish the primed from the non-primed mentation reports at a 
significant statistical level (t = 2.80,  df =10, p = .019)  with a large effect 
size of r = .8.  
This indicates that the content of the ganzfeld imagery reflects, at 
least to a marked degree,  the material  that  the participant  has been 
exposed to prior to the session.      
Contrary to our expectations and hypothesis, only 4 hits (first rank 
placements) were obtained with the primed targets (t = 1.64, df = 28, p  
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>.05). This gave a 13.79% scoring rate where MCE is 25% for the 29 
trials that were carried out with the primed targets. 
The non-primed control series gave double so many hits but this is 
a result which is close to chance expectancy: 8 hits of 29 (27.59% where 
MCE is 25%).  A paired t-test showed the difference between direct hits 
for primed and non-primed target clips did not reach significance on a 
two tailed test (t = 1.28, df = 28, p >.05). 
The results for the primed series could be said to be in the psi-
missing direction, and as such give an small to medium effect size at 
.20 which is compatible with the usual effect size claimed for the psi-
ganzfeld but in the opposite direction to the one usually predicted.  
Discussion 
Since the ganzfeld, including the real time digital ganzfeld, has a 
previous  track  record  of  success  in  our  laboratory,  it  was  thought 
important  to  preserve  the  same  conditions  that  appeared  to  have 
facilitated this success.  For this reason we selected participants who 
appeared to have similar beliefs and expectancies to those used our 
previous experiments and we attempted to carry out the sessions in a 
similar  manner  to  that  which previously  had given positive results. 
Since  the  results  here  appeared  to  be  the  reverse  of  what  we  had 
expected,  some  analysis  and  speculation  concerning  the  possible 
explanations may be deemed appropriate.  
While in a very general sense the findings here could be regarded 
as a failure  of  the ganzfeld to replicate,  it  should be noted that  the 
design, by presenting the film clip material prior to the actual ganzfeld 
session, involved a major departure from the standard design that has 
been recommended for replication studies (Storm et al, 2010).
Ideally we would have preferred to have run a pilot study prior to 
this study which might have enabled us to have avoided the pitfalls 
evident  in  this  study  but  practical  priorities  meant  much  of  our 
resources  for  the  study  had  to  be  first  be  given  to  updating  our 
equipment.  Retrospectively, it now seems rather self-evident that the 
experiment was much too top heavy and over ambitious. Requiring the 
85
Subliminal Priming of  Ganzfeld Targets
participants to see four film clips at a semi-subliminal or subliminal 
level  prior  to  the  ganzfeld  session,  risked  overloading  them  with 
emotional  material  from  each  of  the  film  clips.  Since  priming  the 
receiver  for  the  target  films was  the  major  variable  under  study,  a 
better alternative would have been to prime randomly only one of the 
four clips in the set.  While preferable,  in order to achieve the same 
number  of  trials,  this  would  have  extended  the  experiment  in  a 
fourfold manner in terms of time and trials. 
As it stands, the effect may have then been such that instead of 
priming the material  and making it  available for psi  to “potentiate” 
and distinguish the target  clip form the others,  the material  merely 
overwhelmed the senders and receivers with imagery. It seems likely 
that a multiple working-through process in the fantasy and ganzfeld 
imagery may have thereby been elicited and these processes may have 
blocked  any  potential  psi  influence.  Given  that  the  potential  psi 
influence is generally a weak or medium to weak effect, then any such 
influence  would  presumably  have  been  swamped  by  the  personal 
preferences in the associations brought out by the thematic material.
The notion of psi-missing (Rhine, 1952) is often claimed to occur in 
conditions of stress or over-demands which would be the case here. 
Naturally, some critics (e.g.,  Alcock, 2003) dismiss psi-missing as an 
ad-hoc hypothesis but it  is hardly so,  given that two-tailed tests are 
now customary.  In the results  here,  the low scoring does not  reach 
significance  on  a  two-tailed  test  so  we  cannot  conclude  from  the 
negative scores that this effect is present.  Nevertheless effects similar 
to  psi-missing  have  been  found  in  the  priming  experiments  of 
cognitive psychology. Here the effect is called “reverse priming” and it 
is speculated that they are an automatic correction of unintended bias – 
an overcompensation (Glaser & Kihlstrom, 2005). This suggests that in 
subliminal  perception,  there  are  some  findings  consistent  to  both 
cognitive and parapsychology. Although subliminal priming may not 
be the royal road to producing large effect sizes, it does provide a tool 
for  influencing  and  loading  target  material.  Moreover  the  present 
study  does  gives  strong  support  for  the  existence  of  a  causal 
connection  between  occurrence  of  the  recent  subliminal  or  semi-
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subliminal imagery and the subsequent imagery reported as occurring 
in the Ganzfeld state. 
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Abstract
The  social  networking  site  ‘Twitter’  was  used  to  conduct  a  mass 
participation  remote  viewing  ESP  study.   The  easy  accessibility  of 
Twitter  made  it  possible  to  recruit  and  engage  a  large  number  of 
participants, and to give them almost immediate feedback. A majority 
voting  technique  was  used  to  combine  participants’  calls,  to  avoid 
stacking effects and to detect any group-level psi effect. For each trial an 
experimenter visited the target location. Blind judging was conducted 
with photographs of the target location and four decoy locations. Over 
five thousand responses were gathered over five trials.  The first trial 
employed a  non-blind judging procedure  to  test  the  hypothesis  that 
believers  would  be  especially  likely  to  exhibit  confirmation  bias.  As 
predicted,  a  significant  relationship  was  found  between  belief  in 
psychic  ability  and  level  of  perceived  correspondence  between  the 
participants’  impressions  and the target  location.  The following four 
trials used blind judging. On each trial the group failed to identify the 
correct target. There was no significant relationship between belief in 
psychic ability and choice of  target  on any of  the trials.  Participants 
reporting a strong belief in psychic ability identified the correct target 
on one trial (exact binomial p = .41). Those participants who reported 
that  they  believed  they  were  psychic  and  were  confident  of  their 
response failed to identify the correct target on any trial.
Introduction
 
Since the 1930s,  parapsychologists  have used mass participation 
methods in an attempt to increase the statistical power of their studies 
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and  address  the  question  of  small  effect  sizes  (Goodfellow,  1938; 
Milton  &  Wiseman,  1999).  However,  typically  mass  participation 
studies involve participants sitting at home trying to guess the identity 
of  a  distant  target,  and not  receiving feedback until  days or  weeks 
later, something that is quite unlike laboratory ESP methods, and not 
at  all  engaging  for  participants.  Today,  the  explosion  of  Internet 
technologies  presents  researchers  with  improved  opportunities  not 
only to involve large numbers of participants, but also to engage them 
with immediate feedback. The work described here presents the first 
parapsychology  study  to  recruit  and  run  participants  using  the 
popular social networking tool ‘Twitter’.  
Twitter is an Internet-based micro-blogging system that allows an 
individual  to  instantly  send  text-based  messages  of  up  to  140 
characters (known as ‘tweets’) to a group of people that have chosen to 
‘follow’ that individual  (see  https://twitter.com/). Since its creation in 
2006,  Twitter  has  gained  considerable  attention  from  the  online 
community, attracted millions of users, and is consistently ranked as 
one of the world’s most visited websites.  To discover whether Twitter 
could be used as an effective research tool, this paper reports a proof of 
principle study exploring a form of alleged psychic ability known as 
‘remote  viewing’.  The  study  also  explored  reasons  for  participants’ 
subjective perceptions of correspondence between target locations and 
their impressions.
Remote viewing is the alleged ability to gather information about a 
distant location using paranormal means.  The best-known work into 
this apparent phenomenon was initiated by the American government 
in the early 1970s, and involved over twenty years of experimental and 
applied research exploring whether it could assist military intelligence 
(Mumford, Rose & Goslin, 1995).  Some of this experimental research 
was examined by two reviewers on behalf of the American Institutes 
for Research (AIR) in the mid 1990s, with one reviewer concluding that 
the work had demonstrated the existence of a statistically significant 
effect  (Utts,  1995)  and  the  other  arguing  that  it  had  not  been 
independently replicated (Hyman, 1995). 
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In  remote  viewing  research  individuals  are  asked  to  try  to 
psychically identify a distant target location, with their success being 
determined by the level of correspondence between their thoughts and 
the location.  Skeptics have criticised some of the work, noting that any 
non-blind  assessment  of  results  is  open  to  confirmation  bias,  with 
people  overestimating  the  level  of  correspondence  between  their 
thoughts  and a target  by ignoring mismatches and interpreting any 
ambiguous elements in their favour (Marks, 2000).  It has been further 
hypothesised that individuals who believe in psychic ability may be 
more especially  likely  to  demonstrate  this  bias  (Blackmore,  1992; 
Brugger & Graves, 1997), with indirect support for this notion coming 
from studies showing that believers are significantly more able than 
others  to  ‘find’  non-existent  images  within  random  dot  patterns 
(Blackmore  &  Moore,  1994;  Brugger  et  al.,  1993),  and  illusory 
connections  between  randomly  paired  stimuli  (Brugger,  Regard, 
Landis,  Krebs,  &  Niederberger,  1994;  Wiseman  &  Smith,  2002; 
Pizzagalli, Lehmann, & Brugger, 2001).  Only one previous study has 
addressed the issue somewhat more directly by presenting believers 
and skeptics with made-up data from a fictitious remote viewing study 
(French,  Herrmann,  Hales,  &  Northam,  1996).  As  predicted,  the 
believers  reported  finding  especially  high  levels  of  correspondence 
between the remote viewers’ comments and the alleged target.  
The first part of the current study was the first to employ a non-
blind judging procedure during a genuine test of remote viewing to 
directly test the hypothesis that believers would be especially likely to 
exhibit  confirmation  bias.  An  experimenter  travelled  to  a  distant 
location and then asked participants to tweet their thoughts about the 
nature  of  that  location.  Participants  then  saw  a  photograph  of  the 
location  and  were  asked  to  assess  the  degree  of  correspondence 
between their thoughts and the photograph. It was predicted that the 
overall level of perceived correspondence would be high (hypothesis 
1), and that participants who believed in the existence of psychic ability 




Proponents  of  psychic  ability  could  argue  that  these  predicted 
effects  could be due to participants  possessing  psychic  ability,  with 
those who believe in such abilities being especially gifted. A second 
part  of  the  study  assessed  this  notion  by  running  a  series  of  trials 
employing  blind  judging  procedures.  During  each  of  four  trials  an 
experimenter travelled to a distant location and then asked participants 
to tweet their thoughts about the nature of that location.  On each trial, 
participants  then  saw  five  images  of  different  locations  (the  actual 
target and four decoys) and were asked to choose the one that best 
matched their thoughts.  This modified procedure controls for possible 
confirmation  bias  (see  Milton  and  Wiseman,  1997)  and  thus  any 
significant  effects  would  support  the  existence  of  psychic  ability 
(hypothesis 3).  This second stage of the study also acted as a further 
test of the remote viewing hypothesis, examining the performance of 
participants who might be expected to produce especially high scores – 
those who believed in the existence of psychic abilities (hypothesis 4) 
and those who believed that they possessed psychic abilities and were 
especially confident about their responses (hypothesis 5), as assessed 
by an online questionnaire. 
While mass participation studies have the benefit of enabling large 
numbers of individuals to participate in ESP testing, this method can 
be undermined by an artefact called the ‘stacking effect’, which occurs 
when  multiple  calls  are  made  on  a  single  target  (Greville,  1944). 
Although  target  guesses  may  be  non-independent  (e.g.,  due  to 
stereotypical  thinking  or  knowledge  of  others’  guesses),  statistical 
analyses typically assume independence. The simplest solution to this 
is to use the ‘majority vote’ technique (Thouless & Brier, 1970), which 
combines participants’ calls for a single target. This technique has had 
some success in ESP testing (e.g., Barker, Messer & Drucker, 1976; Brier 
& Tyminski, 1970; Carpenter 1991); indeed it may have a theoretical 
advantage that goes beyond avoiding a statistical artefact. If there is a 
genuine but weak effect (in this case, a putative psi signal), it may be 
detected  if  calls  are  combined  so  that  the  noise  cancels  out  –  a 
phenomenon  that  has  in  mainstream  research  been  termed  ‘the 
wisdom of  crowds’  (Surowiecki,  2005).  The  present  study  therefore 
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uses Twitter to engage large numbers of participants and present them 
with immediate target feedback, and averages their calls to exploit any 
group-level remote viewing effect. Only five trials were used in order 
to prove the principle that Twitter could be used to conduct such a 
study, and because Twitter is typified by short-term interactions.
Method
Procedure
Participants were initially recruited via media reports, resulting in 
approximately 3000 people following the Twitter account being used to 
run the experiment.  News of the experiment then spread on Twitter, 
with  people  sending  messages  about  the  study  to  their  networks, 
resulting  in  an  additional  4000  individuals  following  the  account. 
Different numbers of participants were involved in each trial, and the 
method cannot establish which participants took part in all five trials. 
Each trial took place at 3pm BST on five consecutive days.  One hour 
before the start of each trial the experimenters sent a tweet reminding 
participants about the forthcoming trial.  
Non-blind trial: During the non-blind trial the experimenter travelled 
to the target location (a weir) and sent a tweet asking participants to 
submit their thoughts and impressions about the location via Twitter. 
Twenty  minutes  later  the  experimenter  sent  a  second  tweet  asking 
participants  to  complete  an online  questionnaire.  This  questionnaire 
asked  participants  to  indicate  their  sex  (response  options:  ‘male’, 
‘female’), whether they believed that psychic ability exists (‘definitely 
yes’, ‘probably yes’, ‘uncertain’, ‘probably no’, ‘definitely no’) and the 
degree of correspondence between their thoughts and a photograph of 
the  weir  (‘very  high’,  ‘high’,  ‘medium’,  ‘low’,  ‘very  low’).  Thirty 
minutes later the questionnaire was closed.
Blind judging trials:  The 20 locations used during the blind judging 
trials  were  chosen  and  photographed  prior  to  the  experiment.  The 
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images  were  sorted  into  4  sets  of  5  photographs,  with  each  set 
consisting  of  locations  that  were  visually  maximally  different.  Each 
image in each set was then randomly labeled A through E, and each set 
randomly was assigned to one of the four trials. 
During each of the four trials an experimenter randomly selected a 
target from the appropriate set of five possible locations.  This involved 
visiting  www.random.org –  a  website  that  generates  true  random 
numbers via atmospheric  noise  – and generating a random number 
between  1  and  5  (where  1  =  Image  A,  2  =  Image  B,  etc.).  The 
experimenter then travelled to the chosen location.  Once there,  they 
sent  a  tweet  asking  participants  to  submit  their  thoughts  and 
impressions about the location via Twitter. All of the tweets sent after 
the target had been selected contained a standard wording to ensure 
that they could not contain any clues about the location.  
Twenty minutes later the experimenter then sent a second tweet 
asking  participants  to  complete  an  online  questionnaire.  This 
questionnaire  asked  participants  to  indicate  their  sex,  whether  they 
believed that psychic ability exists, and whether they thought that they 
had  psychic  ability  (‘definitely  yes’,  ‘probably  yes’,  ‘uncertain’, 
‘probably no’, ‘definitely no’).  Participants were then presented with 
five photographs, and asked to select the location that best matched 
their  thoughts  and rate  how confident  they were  about  their  guess 
(‘very  confident’,  ‘fairly  confident’,  ‘not  very  confident’,  ‘not  at  all 
confident’). Thirty minutes after that the questionnaire was closed and 




As predicted by hypothesis 1, many participants reported a large 
degree of correspondence between their thoughts and the target, with 
around  38%  of  the group  rating  the  correspondence  as  ‘medium’, 
‘high’,  or  ‘very  high’.   As  predicted  by  hypothesis  2,  there  was  a 
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significant relationship between belief in psychic ability and level of 
perceived correspondence (N = 1093, χ2 = 119.24, df = 16, p < .0001, effect 
size  Phi =  .33),  with  those  expressing  a  belief  in  the  paranormal 
reporting higher levels of correspondence than others (see Table 1).  
Blind judging trials
Each participant was able to see all of the ‘tweets’ sent by other 
participants,  and  thus  their  responses  cannot  be  considered 
independent.  Because of this, the data was analysed using a  ‘majority 
vote’ technique that treats the group as a single unit of analysis (Brier 
& Tyminski, 1970).  The location that received the greatest percentage 
of votes on each trial was seen as the group’s selection.  If this location 
matched the actual target location then the trial was deemed a hit.  If 
not,  it  was  deemed  a  miss.   For  the  experiment  to  be  considered 
significant, it had to yield three or more hits (associated binomial p = 
.02). On each trial the group failed to identify the correct target, thus 
hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Table 1. Percentage of respondents as a function of belief in psychic ability and level of perceived 
correspondence between their thoughts and the target.













Very low 53.39 44.55 31.89 25.38 18.40 36.96
Low 20.76 26.60 26.49 22.84 20.25 23.70
Medium 13.56 17.95 23.24 22.84 30.67 20.68
High 8.47 8.65 12.43 19.80 14.11 12.08
Very high 3.81 2.24 5.95 9.14 16.56 6.59
Participants reporting a strong belief  in the existence of psychic 
ability (answering ‘definitely yes’ to the belief question) identified the 
correct target on one trial (exact binomial p = .41), therefore hypothesis 
4  was  not  supported.  Post-hoc analysis  revealed  that  there  was  no 
significant relationship between belief in psychic ability and choice of 
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target on any of the trials (Trial 1: N = 1322, χ2 = 15.36, df = 16, p = .50: 
Trial 2; N = 1053, χ2  = 13.60, p = .62: Trial 3: N = 815, χ2  = 11.18, p = .80: 
Trial 4: N = 726, χ2 = 15.11, p = .52).  
Finally,  those participants who reported that they believed they 
were psychic (answering ‘definitely yes’ to the psychic ability question) 
and were confident of their  response (answering ‘very confident’  or 
‘fairly confident’ to the confidence question) also failed to identify the 
correct target on any trial, thus providing no support for hypothesis 5.
The target locations, and the locations chosen by the majority of 
participants, are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Targets selected by all participants, those who believed in psychic ability, and those who 
believed they possessed psychic ability and were confident about their responses (total number of 




All participants Believe in psychic ability Believe that psychic and 
confident






























In the non-blind trial the overall level of perceived correspondence 
was high, and participants who believed in the existence of psychic 
ability reported significantly higher levels than others.   In the blind 
trials  (which  eliminated  potential  confirmation  biases)  participants 
were unable to accurately identify the target locations, and there was 
no  significant  difference  between  the  performance  of  believers  and 
others.  In  addition,  the  one  group  of  participants  that  might  be 
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expected  to  produce  especially  high  scores  –  those  who  reported 
possessing psychic abilities and who were especially confident about 
their responses – failed to identify any of the targets. Participants who 
believed in the existence of psychic ability identified one target, which 
is  close  to  chance  performance.  These  findings  do  not  support  the 
existence of remote viewing.  They do, however, suggest that the use of 
non-blind judging procedures in remote viewing research is likely to 
inflate  the  level  of  perceived  correspondence  between  participants’ 
thoughts and a target location, especially for those who believe in the 
existence of such abilities.  Interestingly, such uncontrolled procedures 
are frequently used by those running public workshops and seminars 
that  claim  to  develop  individuals’  remote  viewing  skills,  and  thus 
could easily convince participants  that  they do indeed possess  such 
abilities.  In addition, although the present study explored this effect 
within the context of a remote viewing study, it is easy to imagine how 
the same mechanism could cause people to believe that their dreams 
predict the future or that an astrological reading accurately describes 
their  past.  As  such,  an  individual’s  ability  to  find  illusory 
correspondences  between  their  thoughts  and  external  events  could 
play  a  key  role  in  the  formation  and  maintenance  of  belief  in  the 
paranormal. 
The study does have some limitations. While it attempted to tap 
the wisdom of the crowds by using a majority vote method, it was not 
able to detect any evidence for remote viewing. With only four blind 
trials, though, there is a risk of committing a Type II error (failing to 
detect  a  genuine  effect)  and we would  recommend using  a  greater 
number of trials in future research using this method (we could not 
estimate statistical power beforehand due to the difficulty in accurately 
estimating effect size with an untested method that also uses majority 
vote techniques). Additionally, the majority vote method will have the 
effect of detecting any group-level effect, and this could include group 
biases (e.g, a stereotypical preference for the leftmost target in an array 
of target possibilities; ideally the order of presentation of the array of 
target  possibilities  should  be  randomised  so  as  to  eliminate  this 
potential  bias).  This  kind  of  group  level  effect  could  outweigh any 
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more  subtle  group  psi  effect,  once  again  suggesting  that  a  larger 
number of trials would be needed in future.
This  experiment  also  examined  the  potential  of  Twitter  as  a 
research tool, using this relatively new form of social media to both 
recruit and run participants.  The results were, for the most part, very 
encouraging.  Several  thousand people signed up for the experiment 
and each trial  attracted around a thousand people  who contributed 
their  data  in  a  very  short  space  of  time.  Although  there  was  some 
attrition from one trial to the next, the study maintained a healthy rate 
of participation.  In addition, the study attracted participants with a 
wide  range  of  beliefs  about  psychic  ability,  and  the  large  numbers 
involved meant that even focused sub-groups of individuals, such as 
those  believing  that  they  were  psychic  and  confident  about  their 
responses, contained healthy numbers of people.
The  remote  viewing  study  worked  well  because  it  caught  the 
interest  of  both  the  media  and  public  alike,  and  utilised  Twitter’s 
ability to provide a near instant response from participants, and to give 
them near instant feedback. It seems likely that other studies that share 
these features are also likely to succeed on Twitter.  This could include, 
for example, studies using the ‘experience-sampling method’, wherein 
participants  report  their  thoughts  and  feelings  the  moment  they 
receive  a  certain  signal  (see,  e.g.,  Larson  &  Csikszentmihalyi,  1983; 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004). The inter-connectedness of Twitter users, 
combined  with  the  potential  for  messages  about  studies  to  reach  a 
large audience, also means that it  may also prove a highly effective 
way of recruiting specialised groups of participants.
In short, this study did not yield any evidence for remote viewing, 
but  did  show  that  the  perceived  correspondences  between  a 
participant’s thoughts and the target in uncontrolled remote viewing 
trials  could  be  due  to  confirmation  bias,  and  that  individuals  who 
believe in the paranormal are especially prone to this bias.  The study 
also showed that Twitter can be used as a new form of research tool, 
and can be an effective way of recruiting and running participants. It 
seems that  the nature  of  Twitter  makes it  especially  well  suited for 
studies that  require  an immediate response from a large number of 
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participants,  and  that  would  benefit  from  giving  participants 
immediate feedback. We look forward to other experimenters utilising 
this tool in creative ways.
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Research Brief:
The Effect of ‘Sigilisation’ on Forced–Choice 
ESP Task Success
Ian R. Hume & William V. Bean
Department of Psychology, Coventry University, UK
Abstract
This exploratory study endeavoured to test the possible enhancing  
capabilities of sigil magic, a form of chaos magic, upon forced-choice  
clairvoyant ability. An opportunity sample of 39 participants was  
employed in this repeated measures study. In the first condition a  
standard  deck  of  Zener  cards  was  used  to  measure  ESP  task  
success. In the second condition, a ‘sigilised’ deck was employed.  
Combined,  a  significant  psi-hitting  effect  was  produced.  In  the  
standard condition a  non-significant,  above  chance,  hit  rate  was  
found. In the sigilised condition, a highly significant hitting effect  
was evidenced. However, a comparison of the hit rates for these two  
conditions  failed  to  show  a  significant  difference.  Although  the  
results of this study are encouraging, methodological issues need to  
be addressed in order to determine the validity of these findings.
Introduction
 
Many researchers involved in conducting controlled tests of ESP 
are  keenly aware of  the effects  of  psi-conducive practices  (Delanoy, 
1997) and the possible effects of the researcher upon ESP task success 
(Schmeidler, 1997). However, the present authors are not aware of any 
research  that  has  investigated  the  effects  of  the  researcher’s  will, 
through  the  practice  of  ‘magic’  to  manipulate  task  success.  The 
research presented herein attempted to investigate this possibility.
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The particular form of magic used in this study is known as sigil 
magic  and was popularised  by Austin  Osman Spare  (for  a  recently 
published  collection  of  his  writings,  see  Spare,  2007).  Hine  (1995) 
describes  sigil  magic  as  “simple,  results-oriented,  and  is  effective 
regardless  of  one’s  beliefs  or  metaphysical  speculations  in  general” 
(p.80). Essentially, a statement of intent is created by the practitioner 
and then any repeating letters within the statement are removed. The 
remaining letters are then abstracted into a symbol (sigil). The sigil is 
then ‘charged’ with the will of the person that created it in the belief 
that a desired outcome will ensue from this ritual. Thus, the purpose of 
sigilisation is to satisfy the desire of the practitioner. 
David  Luke  (2007,  p.  90)  notes  the  “uncanny  resemblance” 
between the work of Spare and the propositions put forward by Rex 
Stanford  (1974)  for  his  psi-mediated  instrumental  response  (PMIR) 
model of psychic functioning. Essentially, Stanford proposes that psi is 
evolutionarily  adaptive  in  that  it  serves  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
individual.  Operating  at  a  sub-conscious  level,  need-serving 
information is acquired by psi so that an appropriate response can be 
made. Thus, the adaptive function is easily recognised if we consider 
how  this  ability  may  enhance  our  chances  of  avoiding  predators, 
finding food, shelter, a mate, etc. 
In  the  context  of  experimentation  to  investigate  psi,  Stanford 
(1981) notes that if his model is correct, then the psi task success may 
not be due to the participant, but rather the desire of the researcher (or 
practitioner). If we can accept the possibility of experimenter psi in ESP 
research (Kennedy & Taddonio, 1976; Scheimdler, 1997; White; 1976) 
then it would be equally legitimate to hypothesise that it may well be 
possible to use sigil ‘magic’ to exert the experimenter’s will to influence 
something such as the outcome of an ESP task.
An adaptation of Rhine and Zener’s forced-choice technique is an 
ideal method to explore the possible effects of sigil magic upon ESP. It 
allows the researcher to collect a great deal of data with relative ease 
and  speed.  Due  to  the  method  of  sigil  magic  employed  in  the 
experiment,  differences  in  hit  rates  are  easily  exposed.  It  was 
hypothesised that the will of the researcher, using sigil magic, would 
influence  the  hit  rate  of  scores  in  a  test  of  clairvoyance  using  the 
forced-choice  method.  It  was  predicted  that  this  effect  would  be 
positive  in  that  a  sigilised  deck  of  Zener  cards  would  yield  a 
significantly higher hit rate than a control deck. Finally, it was further 
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predicted that, due to the enhancement of the hit rate in the sigilised 





A repeated measures experimental design was employed in this 
closed-deck,  forced-choice  test  of  clairvoyance.  Two  levels  of  the 
independent  variable  were  manipulated;  the presence  or  absence  of 
sigil  magic in testing. The effects of the ‘sigil  magic’ condition were 
observed directly  after  the first  ‘non-magical’  (or control)  condition. 
The  dependent  variable  was  the  number  of  ‘hits’  gained  in  each 
condition.
Participants
An opportunity sample of 391 participants was invited to take part 
in this experiment in return for course credit. There were 22 male and 
17  female  participants  who  were  students  of  Coventry  University 
studying for a B.Sc in Psychology. Recruitment was made through the 
use of discussion forums using the University’s intranet service.  No 
other demographic data were collected. 
Materials
A number of materials were used during the testing phase. A set 
of  25  plain  white  laminated cards measuring 10.5cm  × 11.5cm each 
bearing a  single  rune  on their  face  was created in order to  test  for 
clairvoyant ability. The set of cards designed by the researchers was 
heavily influenced by Karl Zener in his creation of the ‘ESP Deck’. In 
total there were five different runic designs and within the set of 25 
cards there were five of each type of rune. A further ten prompt, or 
reference, cards were created (two for each type of rune); five of them 
were created for the control condition and the other five were for the 
sigil condition. The identifying factor of the sigil magic cards was the 
1 The researchers had aimed to recruit forty participants and this was achieved. However, one participant later 
requested that their data be withdrawn. This was done at a stage when it was no longer possible for the second 
author to recruit further participants.
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prominent sigil design printed on the back of the cards. Although the 
sigil  used  on  the  backs  of  these  cards  was  identical,  the  cards 
themselves were unique; each having one of the previous runes drawn 
on their face, matching the plain set. Instruction on the creation of a 
sigil spell was dictated by two books in particular; ‘Condensed Chaos: 
An introduction  to  chaos  magic’  (Hine,  1995,  p.81)  and  ‘Basic  Sigil 
Magic’ (Cooper, 2001, p.39). 
The  modern  technique  of  sigil  magic  is  described  as  a  simple 
magical process.  In order to press the magical will  onto the cards a 
specific sigil  has to be fashioned in the mind of the individual who 
utilises the technique. In the context of this experiment this was done 
by writing one’s will out in a sentence and then carefully eliminating 
repeating letters until there were only single cases left. These form a 
jumble of letters that were incorporated into a singular visual design. 
Both  Hine  (1995)  and  Cooper  (2001)  stress  the  importance  of 
getting the statement of intent as precise as possible in order to gain a 
beneficial effect. The magical will of the researcher (WB) in this case 
was: ‘It is my will to enhance the bearer’s clairvoyant ability’. This was 
broken down to ‘ITSMYWLOENHACBRV’. Each of these letters was 
used in the design of the sigil. 
The second half of the process required the researcher to fall into 
an  altered  state  of  consciousness  or  ‘gnosis’  with  the  purpose  of 
empowering the sigil. There are several ways of achieving this state of 
mind,  however due to the researcher’s  recent  meditative practices a 
simple  form  of  meditation  was  used.  In  a  meditative  state  the 
researcher continually focused upon the statement of intent, ‘It is my 
will  to enhance  the bearer’s  clairvoyant  ability’  and the sigil  design 
outlined above. According to Hine (1995, p.85), this state projects the 
magical will “into the multiverse”. It is this projection that purportedly 
empowers the sigil.     
Procedure
Ethical approval to conduct this experiment was gained through 
Coventry University’s ethics committee. Although this study and the 
experimental  procedure  in  general  were  seemingly  harmless  to 
individuals,  religious  or  personal  belief  had  the  potential  to  cause 
discomfort to sensitive participants. Generally witchcraft and sorcery 
are  frowned upon by the religious  groups and it  is  understandable 
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how  discussion  of  metaphysical  processes  may  invite  confusion  or 
dismay among certain people. It was therefore important to highlight 
the use of sigil magic and its proposed use in experimentation.
Participants  were  welcomed  and  made  to  feel  at  ease  as  the 
researcher handed them a participant information sheet detailing the 
purpose  of  the  study  and  reasons  for  being  approached  by  the 
researcher. Participants were then handed a set of written instructions 
that set out the general layout of the testing phase. To ensure that each 
participant had understood the test instruction and awareness of their 
anonymity  and  right  to  withdrawal  the  researcher  repeated  the 
instructions  and  outline  of  the  experiment  verbally.  Before  testing 
commenced,  participants  were  reminded of  their  right  to  withdraw 
from the study at any point.
The  general  procedure  of  the  experiment  after  gaining  consent 
followed this course of action: 
The researcher (WB) placed the prompt pack of five cards for the 
control  condition face down besides the participant.  The deck of  25 
cards were then shuffled and laid out in a five-by-five grid in front of 
the participant. Due to there being five of each type of card present in 
the grid, the chances of gaining a hit is one in five (or twenty percent). 
The participant was then instructed to pick the top card from the 
pile of prompt cards. They were then asked to hold onto the card and 
visualise a card in the grid that appeared to ‘stand out’  to them, or 
failing that to choose a card that they thought may match the one held. 
Upon choosing the card the participant would show it to the researcher 
and either a ‘hit’ or ‘miss’ would be recorded. The card used as the 
focus was then discarded and the set of twenty five in the grid were 
shuffled once again. This process was important due to the fact that a 
test of pure clairvoyance is impossible if the researcher knew even a 
single location of a rune in the set; turning a test of pure clairvoyance 
into a test of extrasensory perception with the inclusion of telepathy.
The process of discarding and reshuffling was repeated until the 
final card in the non-sigil condition was investigated. Upon completion 
of this condition the participant was informed of the significance of 
sigilisation and commencement of the second condition. This condition 
was the sigil magic condition. The five sigilised cards were placed face 
down  next  to  the  participant  and  (as  in  the  control  condition)  the 
participant was asked to select the card at the top of the pile. In total, 
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ten trials were completed; five in the normal condition and five in the 
sigil condition. 
Upon  completion  of  the  experiment,  participants  were  verbally 
debriefed  alongside  presentation  of  a  debriefing  form  stating  the 
participants’ right to withdraw from the study without giving a reason.
Results
As there was a one in five (20%) chance of participants correctly 
selecting the target, MCE for the total 390 trials would be 78 correct 
selections. However, overall results showed an overall hit rate of 101 
(25.9%) correct  selections.  Using the formula for  analyses  of  closed-
deck  tests  of  ESP  given  by  Palmer  (1986,  p.  148-149),  this  hit  rate 
proved to be significantly higher than MCE:  z = 2.91,  p = .004 (two-
tailed).  Therefore,  the  combined  hit  rate  of  both  conditions  would 
suggest support for the existence of a psi effect. 
In the control condition, participants correctly selected the target 
45 times over 195 trials (23.08%). While this was above MCE, it was not 
significantly so:  z = 1.07,  p = .284 (two-tailed).  However,  in the sigil 
magic  condition,  participants  correctly  selected  the  target  on  56 
occasions (28.72%), yielding a significant,  above-chance,  hit  rate:  z = 
3.04,  p = .002 (two-tailed). This would appear to support the possible 
presence  of  sigil  magic  and  the  magical  will  of  the  researcher  in 
enhancing hit-rates. 
However, a z-score contrast of the hit rates for the control and sigil 
magic conditions was not  significant:  z = 1.39,  p = .164 (two-tailed). 
Thus, although the sigil magic condition evidenced more hits than the 
control condition, the hit rate was not significantly higher. 
Discussion
Although  the  results  of  this  exploratory  study  did  not  fully 
support  the  research  hypotheses  in  that  the  difference  between  the 
control and sigil conditions were not significantly different, they are 
nonetheless  encouraging.  A  significant  hit  rate  was  found  in  the 
sigilised  condition  whereas  this  was  not  the  case  in  the  control 
condition.  Thus,  there  seems to be some support  for  the efficacy of 
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chaos magic on ESP task success. However, there are a number of other 
factors that may account for these findings. 
It is clear (by the very nature of the sigilisation procedure) that, 
in the present research, the experimenter (WB) was highly motivated to 
impress his will on the sigilised deck of cards. Therefore, to avoid the 
argument that the findings may have been due to inadvertent subtle 
sensory leakage from the researcher in his enthusiasm for the desired 
outcome,  it  would  have  been  beneficial  to  have  a  researcher  test 
participants that was blind to the research hypotheses. In addition, the 
researcher and the participant could be shielded from one another by 
placing them in separate  rooms and the forced-choice  test  could be 
presented via a computer (with the stimulus material being presented 
on  monitors)  rather  than  hand-held  cards.  Such  procedures  would 
greatly reduce the possibility of sensory leakage.
Even with the possibility of sensory leakage controlled for in a 
more rigorous manner, there may still have been a motivational effect 
on the participants due to the nature of the decks of cards. On one set 
(the sigilised set), there were symbols on the back of the cards whereas 
on the other set there were no markings at all. Thus, participants may 
have anticipated that the set marked with the runes were specifically 
developed with some experimental manipulation in mind. If we can 
assume  that  participants  were  motivated  towards  task  success,  this 
may well have promoted psi functioning – therefore accounting for the 
enhanced  effect  shown  in  the  sigilised  condition.  To  determine 
whether this is the case, in future research, an additional deck of cards 
could  be  included  that  also  had  ‘un-sigilised’,  arbitrarily  selected 
symbols on the back of the cards. This un-sigilised deck would then 
help to determine whether or not it was the mere presence of symbols 
which motivated participants  to perform better.  This would at  least 
enable  us  to  determine  whether  the  effect  was  due  to  participant 
motivation  or  some  anomalous  manipulation  by  the  experimenter. 
However, at this stage we cannot rule out the possibility that the effect 
may be due to a subtle psi interaction between the experimenter’s will 
and  the  participants’  motivation;  a  suggestion  that  is  neatly 
accommodated by Thalbourne’s (2004) theory of ‘Psychopraxia’ (for a 
succinct outline of the basic tenets of this theory, see Roberts & Hume, 
2007).
Despite the apparent methodological shortcomings of the present 
research,  there  is  nevertheless  some  evidence  for  an  enhanced  psi-
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hitting effect. Thus, such a practice may be regarded as conducive to 
providing  proof-oriented  evidence  for  the  existence  of  ESP.  The 
process by which this happens warrants further systematic research.
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Book Review 
José M. Pérez-Navarro
Department of Psychology and Counselling, University of Greenwich,
 United Kingdom
A review of “El Mundo Oculto de los Sueños/The Occult World of 
Dreams”  by Alejandro Parra (2009) 
The  literature  on  dreams  and  the  dreaming  experience  is  vast. 
However, the escaping nature of this phenomenon and the diversity of 
approaches  adopted  make  it  difficult  to  answer  key  questions  like 
whether  dreams  fulfil  psychological  needs  or  whether  their 
interpretation can be of any use to us.  In this book Parra reviews a 
large body of theory and research,  making great effort  to provide a 
clear picture of the current state of the art in relation to this intriguing 
cognitive activity.
In chapter  one (Teorías  de  los  sueños,  Theories  of  dreams),  Parra 
examines a diversity of theories, taking the reader from the classical 
psychoanalytical and Jungian theories to more contemporary cognitive 
approaches. Something I particularly liked from this chapter was the 
inclusion by the author of a description of dream-related disorders as 
well as a physiological account of the dreaming experience.
In a second chapter (Análisis de contenido en el estudio de los sueños, 
Content analysis in the study of dreams), the author deepens into the 
examination of the content of dreams, describing a series of methods, 
like Hall and van de Castle’s method for categorising and analysing 
dreams. This chapter, interestingly, integrates a good body of research 
on individual differences in dreaming and dream content in relation to 
gender, age, and other variables. At the end of this chapter, Parra also 
discusses recurrent and traumatic dreams and includes some cases of 
dreams of survivors of natural disasters. 
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In an interesting third chapter (El potencial  creativo de los  sueños, 
The  creative  power  of  dreams),  Parra,  using  examples  from  the 
literature, writes about the creative value of the dreaming experience. 
This chapter offers an interesting overview of how dreams can help us 
solve  everyday  and  professional  problems  as  well  as  inspire  art, 
creation, and science. Parra argues that dreams can also be motivators 
of personal development and spiritual change.
In chapter four (Imágenes oníricas más allá del tiempo y la distancia, 
Oniric  images  beyond  time  and  distance),  the  author  covers  what, 
historically, has been one of the most controversial approaches to the 
study of dreams while generating most public interest: the paranormal 
meaning of dreams. This chapter includes an analysis of the empirical 
evidence  for  the  value  of  dreams  as  a  vehicle  for  extrasensory 
perception, premonition and spiritual guide.
Chapter five (El trabajo con los sueños, Working with dreams) is, 
from my point  of  view,  the  author’s  most  valuable  contribution  in 
applied terms.  Very few psychologists  make use of  dreams in their 
professional practice. In 50 pages, Parra takes us through a generous 
set of methods and techniques that could be used in a wide number of 
contexts.  Among others,  Parra analyses Hill’s  technique in cognitive 
therapy and Leuner’s  guided affective  imagery  technique.  To finish 
this chapter, the author also describes a method to deal with recurrent 
nightmares.
In brief, Parra’s book is a synthesis of the current state of the art of 
theory  and  research  in  this  area  as  well  as  a  basis  for  new 
development,  as  depicted,  specially,  in  his  fifth  chapter.  My  only 
criticism  would  be  the  succinctness  with  which  the  author  covers 
neurophysiological  aspects  of  dreams  and  dreaming,  though  this 
would take a whole new book and would, probably, be more suitable 
in areas of science other than psychology. The impartiality with which 
Parra deals with the huge diversity of approaches, integrating research 
findings throughout, is a clear strength of this book.
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